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Abstract: Comparative political economy offers a wealth of hypotheses connecting decentralization to improved 
public service delivery. In recent years, influential formal and experimental work has begun to question the 
underlying theory and empirical analyses of previous findings. At the same time, many countries have grown 
dissatisfied with the results of their decentralization efforts and have begun to reverse them. Vietnam is particularly 
intriguing because of the unique way in which it designed its recentralization, piloting a removal of elected People’s 
Councils in ninety-nine districts across the country and stratifying the selection by region, type of province, and 
urban versus rural setting. We take advantage of the opportunity provided by this quasi-experiment to test the core 
hypotheses regarding the decision to shift administrative and fiscal authority to local governments. We find that 
recentralization significantly improved public service delivery in areas important to central policy-makers, especially 
in transportation, healthcare, and communications.  
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In the past few decades, few comparative political economy debates have been as exciting as those concerning 
whether decentralization leads to greater public service delivery. The literature has offered a wealth of intriguing 
hypotheses connecting greater public participation, oversight, and accountability (often through elected councils) to 
a variety of local outcomes.1 Although these studies have been highly influential for policy decisions and 
international aid activities (see World Bank 1994), more recent formal and experimental work has begun to question 
their underlying theory and empirical analyses (Treisman 2007). At the same time, many countries have grown 
dissatisfied with the results of their decentralization efforts and have begun to reverse them (Dickovick 2011). 
Unfortunately, the literature is ill suited to offer empirical predictions on recentralization efforts for two reasons: 1) 
recentralization is a new phenomenon and therefore is under-theorized; and 2) the extant literature on 
decentralization is fiercely contested, offering few findings that withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny. 
In this paper, we attempt to address these oversights by taking advantage of a unique quasi-experiment in 
Vietnam that sheds light on the effects of allocating authority to subnational governments. When Vietnamese 
leaders first began to consider the removal of District People’s Councils (DPCs), the topic was hotly debated both 
within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA).2 Advocates claimed 
that DPCs complicated decision-making by adding an extra node to policy design and implementation, which led to 
sustained hold-ups and extra costs in service delivery, infrastructure rollouts, and land conversion, all of which were 
necessary for economic development (TPCS 2009). Opponents contested the proposal on democratic grounds, 
arguing that the councils represented an important forum enabling citizens to check the power of leaders and rein in 
local corruption (CPV 2010). The dispute was contentious enough that Vietnamese officials followed a grand 
history of pilot programs in Marxist-Leninist regimes3 and confined the recentralization intervention to ten 
provinces (containing ninety-nine districts); this decision allowed them to observe the effects of DPC removal in a 
                                                          
1 See Wibbels (2006), Bardhan and Mookerjee (2008), and Treisman (2007) for helpful reviews. 
2 Debates took place at the 5th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee 2008 and the 4th Session of the 12th VNA. 
3 See Florini et al. (2012) for example.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2299120 
 
3 
 
contained setting before considering a full-scale rollout to Vietnam’s other fifty-three provinces and national-level 
cities (National Assembly 2008). 
What makes Vietnam particularly intriguing for researchers is the careful way in which it designed its 
recentralization experiment. To ensure that the conclusions were not rooted in the particular selection of provinces, 
officials stratified their selection by region, by urban versus rural, and by whether the province shared an 
international border (GSRV 2009). In addition, they made sure to include provinces that varied in their initial 
endowments, previous economic performance, and initial quality of public administration. Although not a 
randomized control trial (RCT), the research design ensured balance on a range of pre-treatment covariates between 
selected and non-selected locations. In other words, it is reasonable to consider the non-selected provinces a 
plausible control group for isolating the causal effects of recentralization. 
We take advantage of this quasi-experiment to test the core hypotheses of decentralization in the literature. Our 
research design offers an overtime (diff-in-diff) analysis of real institutional change (not an artificial intervention) 
with a clearly identified counterfactual performed at scale within one country; this design allows us to hold constant 
the unobserved historical and cultural confounders that have limited previous work. As far as we know, this is the 
first-ever empirical analysis with clear control and treatment groups on the abolishment of an elected council 
affecting more than ten million people. The existing work on institutional change was conducted on a much smaller 
scale and involved NGO or multilateral donor projects rather than national governments’ own initiatives and 
ownership. 
 Studying a large number of services helps us avoid the temptation to cherry-pick particular outcomes that 
confirm our hypotheses (Kramon and Posner 2012). We find that recentralization significantly improved a spectrum 
of public services that were considered important to central policy-makers, ranging from quality of roads to 
healthcare to the presence of post offices. By contrast, the intervention had no discernible effect on services 
deemed important by Vietnamese citizens (education, agricultural extension, and household business development).   
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In a more speculative final section of the paper, we study the causal mechanism through which the DPC pilot 
generated positive performances for services favored by central leaders. There are three candidate mechanisms that 
might explain these results, including the removal of vertical accountability to citizens and improved efficiency 
resulting from bureaucratic restructuring. We demonstrate that the most compelling explanation, however, is that 
the pilot unblocked elite capture of the policy-making process. As researchers have argued in other contexts, the 
purported benefits of decentralization for grassroots monitoring (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Huther and Shah 
1998) can be undermined by local elites (politicians, businessmen, notables), who take advantage of their 
concentrated political resources to manipulate public decisions in their favor (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006; Campos and Hellman 2005). We probe the observable implications of the elite capture 
mechanism through a nationally representative public opinion poll of 9,452 respondents (UNDP 2011), showing 
how recentralization reduced elite corruption in treatment districts. 
 
1. The Literature on Decentralization  
The past two decades have brought forth a rich debate in political science on the relative merits of locally 
elected governments. Camps of scholars and practitioners disagree on the theoretical benefits of granting authority 
to subnational units and the lessons learned from extant empirical work. At the same time, the rapid spread of 
decentralization worldwide, which at its peak led to elections of local governments in 90% of countries around the 
world (Rodden 2006), has subsided. A recent World Bank review of almost 500 studies reveals that the excitement 
about the benefits of locally elected bodies was not met by real-world improvements in outcomes (Mansuri and Rao 
2013). As a result, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Uruguay, South Africa, and a number of other countries have 
started reversing some of these original decisions (Eaton 2004; Dickovick 2011). Vietnam is such a case. 
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Types of Decentralization 
It is important to be clear from the start about where the Vietnamese DPC pilot fits into larger debates in the 
literature. The pilot involved a specific Vietnamese governmental unit (the second-tier district) and a specific body 
(the directly elected legislature). Scholars generally distinguish between modes of decentralization according to three 
considerations:  
1) The arenas in which power has been granted to local authorities: fiscal, administrative, or political (Faletti 2010; 
Green 2005). A series of legal documents developed prior to the pilot provided DPCs with important fiscal 
authority (over budget allocation, approval, and implementation). DPCs also have the authority to elect and remove 
any member of the local executive (the District People’s Committees (DPCOMs)), procuracies, and courts. In 
addition, they have oversight powers over all People’s Councils and People’s Committees of communes within their 
jurisdiction.4 Thus, there are elements of fiscal and administrative decentralization (Fforde 2003). The DPCOM was 
not removed in the pilot, however, so this is only partly administrative recentralization. National legislation on local 
governmental organization also claimed to influence political decentralization through the DPCs’ universal election 
by district citizens, but this claim is contestable. In fact, a key feature of the debate in Vietnam has concerned the 
extent to which the DPC elections are actually democratic and the extent to which they provide downward 
accountability to citizens (Nguyen Anh 2010).  
2) The extent of the power provided: deconcentration, delegation, or devolution (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; White 
and Smoke 2005). Disentangling these three distinctions is tricky; most governments experience different types of 
decentralization at the same time (Grindle 2007). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the DPCs, because they are 
under the hierarchal oversight of the Provincial People’s Council (PPC) and the leadership of the CPV, are 
predominantly recipients of powers of delegation: their independent decision-making is highly circumscribed. The 
ongoing recentralization experiment essentially makes district leaders agents of the province and thereby reinstitutes 
deconcentration to the leaders of the treatment provinces. Following O’Donnell (1994), we can say that the move 
                                                          
4 See the Law on the Organization of Local People’s Councils and Committees (2003). 
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toward recentralization has shifted oversight of DPCOMs from horizontal accountability by DPCs to upward 
accountability to provincial overseers.5 
3) The level or node in the government hierarchy invested with authority: first tier (Rodden 2006), second tier 
(Bardan and Mookerjee 2008), or below. The Vietnamese DPC is a second-tier unit, as it is accountable to the 
provincial authorities above it and oversees the communes below it. What differentiates this study from previous 
work on subnational elections in single-party regimes (see Tsai 2007 and Martinez-Bravo et al. 2010) is that the 
district is an official part of the Vietnamese hierarchy, as opposed to the villages analyzed in China, which have very 
limited authority.  
 
The Costs and Benefits of Decentralization 
The literature on decentralization is rife with controversy. A strong theoretical literature linked to some of the 
most esteemed political thinkers has proffered a range of positive benefits to local engagement in politics. More 
recently, a formal economic literature has generated a series of positive hypotheses regarding public service delivery 
and economic performance.  
Specifically, economists have argued that greater local authority in decision-making improves the efficiency of 
public service delivery, because government outputs can be provided in small units and tailored directly to local 
tastes (Oates 1972; Besley and Coate 2003). In addition, decentralization creates competition for capital and labor, 
leading to improved governance outcomes; brings decision-making closer to citizens; and limits the role of central 
government intervention in economic performance (Tiebout 1956; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). Lab experiments by 
Walker et al (2000) and Kroll et al (2007) provide suggestive evidence for the link between direct democracy and 
efficient public good provision under ideal conditions. Furthermore, Hamman et al. (2011) find that democratic 
                                                          
5 Note that O’Donnell (1994) did not address upward accountability. He differentiated the horizontal accountability 
of institutions from vertical accountability to constituents. 
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delegation helps lab subjects avoid the free-rider problem and frequently achieve more efficient and equitable social 
outcomes. Similar results are also found in psychology experiments (e.g. Wilke et al. 1986) 
As Wibbels (2006) notes, however, work in political economy has laid bare the underlying assumptions of 
decentralization theories (Weingast 1995) and in many cases has demonstrated that they are not met. Thus, the 
economic benefits of decentralization often fail to appear in practice (Prud’homme 1995). Citizens and 
entrepreneurs are often not fully informed about which level of government provides a particular service and 
therefore either cannot take advantage of relocation (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997) or are simply limited in 
their mobility due to sticky labor markets and cultural differences within a country (Pepinsky and Wihardja 2011). 
Newly empowered local authorities may not have the needs of citizens at heart, and they may not understand local 
preferences better than their national counterparts (or than agents of the central government in the localities) (Cai 
and Treisman 2004; Treisman 2007). A number of scholars have found that there is actually no clear division of 
authority between the different nodes in a multi-tiered government (Bolton and Farrell 1990). As a result, service 
delivery may even be less efficient, as decisions and implementation are held up by different levels of government 
(Cox and McCubbins 1992; Treisman 2007) or by the loss of scale economies in provision as services are divided up 
too narrowly (Bardan and Mookherjee 2008). In the language of the discipline, decentralization increases the 
number of veto points in policy making, which biases toward status-quo policy choices and service provision 
(Tsebelis 2002) so that multiple levels of government jointly provide poor public goods (Volden 2005; Wibbels 
2005). Correspondingly, a lab-in-field experiment by Grossman (2012) suggests that centralized decision-making 
(via democratic institutions) improves group outcomes.  
Most importantly for our research, a subset of this literature has found that decentralization can actually 
facilitate capture of the policy-making apparatus by local elites, especially by wealthy notables and large enterprises, 
creating a company town atmosphere in which elections are undermined and policy is diverted to the benefit of the 
powerful at the expense of other citizens (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Campos and Hellman 2005).  
Drawing on these arguments, we test the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The removal of local councils will increase the efficiency of public service delivery.  
Of course, recentralization may not have the same impact on all public services equally. More likely, recentralization 
may shift public services closer to the priorities set by the central government over those favored by the locality. 
Martinez-Bravo et al. (2010) demonstrate that village elections and increased downward accountability in China 
generated policy outcomes that were associated with local preferences. In this paper, we hypothesize that removing 
locally elected councils will have the opposite effect.  
In general, we can group Vietnamese public services into three very broad categories. The first category includes 
transportation and communication infrastructure, such as local roads, public transport, post offices, radio, and 
television networks. The second category includes health and education services to citizens, such as preventive 
healthcare, health insurance, and local schools. The third category includes localized employment generation 
programs, such as household business support, agricultural extension, veterinary services, tax exemptions, 
subsidized credit, and the construction of market places. 
The Vietnamese central government funds all categories of public services, but clearly gives top priority to 
infrastructure, followed by health and education. Following an economic model in which state companies control 
the leading national industries and give priority to large investors (both foreign and domestic), the central 
government has offered little support to private, household farms and businesses. This order of priorities was made 
clear in the 2001-2010 National Strategy for Socio-Economic Development (Central Committee 2000), which states: 
“Infrastructure must move first to meet demands of socio-economic development as well as of national 
defense and security. The transport system is to be smooth and safe all the year round, and modernized. The 
rural transport network is to be expanded and upgraded. The dyke systems are to be fortified; the water 
conservancy systems developed and most of them solidified. Electricity, telephone, other basic postal and 
telecommunication services, dispensaries, solidly built schools, cultural and sports facilities are to be 
available to most communes. To ensure the basic physical conditions for primary and secondary 
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schoolchildren to learn all-day at school. To provide enough hospital beds to patients” (“Strategic Goals 
Section” 8-10). 
The Strategy also emphasizes the leading role of government corporations (p. 10). The strategy discusses state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) at eleven points, while it mentions small and medium enterprises only three times. 
Reducing agricultural output to 16-17% of the GDP and the employment rate to 50% of the total labor force are 
considered two of the state’s “strategic goals.” These priorities have been operationalized in many official 
documents, such as the National Five-Year Plan and the Action Plan of the Government.  
Local citizens, however, seem to have a different order of priorities, according to Vietnamese responses in the 
MyWorld survey. Out of 16 items, Vietnamese citizens prioritized: education (76%), healthcare (62%), responsive 
government (51%), and job opportunities (45%). Better transportation and communications infrastructure ranked 
much further down the list: water and sanitation (32%), transport and roads (31%), and phone and internet access 
(15.4%).6 Further disaggregating preferences, health services are more frequently needed than educational services. 
The 2008 VHLSS shows that 68% of citizens report that their families use local health services, while only 38% of 
citizens report that their families use secondary schools. Thus, we expect: 
H2. The removal of local councils will shift public service delivery toward the priorities set by the 
central government. 
 
In particular, we expect that improvements in infrastructure for transportation and communication are more 
likely than those in health and education, which are favored by both the public and the central government, and far 
more likely than those in household farm and business support, areas in which the central government has 
demonstrated little interest. 
 
  
                                                          
6 See http://data.myworld2015.org/ for details (see Online Appendix A for full results). The MyWorld survey is an 
online, self-selected platform that is rife with selection bias, but similar preference orderings can be seen an 
econometric analysis of the 2011 UNDP-PAPI survey (see Online Appendix B (attached below) for analysis) 
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Extant Empirical Analyses 
In addition to the theoretical limitations of the decentralization hypothesis, the literature has also been sharply 
criticized for the quality of empirical evidence justifying the causal relationships hypothesized. Treisman (2007), for 
instance, devotes the entire eleventh chapter of his book to demonstrating the contradictory empirical findings, 
weak evidence, and lack of robustness of previous work. He summarizes his conclusions by quoting Litvack et al. 
(1998). 
“Much of the discussion of decentralization reflects a curious combination of strong preconceived beliefs 
and limited empirical evidence…. It is not an exaggeration to say that one can prove or disprove almost any 
proposition about decentralization by throwing together some set of cases or data” (13). 
Previous work generally falls into three categories. A large number of scholars have examined the 
decentralization process within individual countries both quantitatively and qualitatively, trying to derive 
generalizable conclusions from their studies. While this work has shed light on the particular forms of 
decentralization, these deep single-country studies have had difficulty establishing causality. In almost every case, 
decentralization occurs as a uniform policy, affecting every subunit of government at a particular level at the same 
time. Thus, there is no control group and no way to see the trajectory a subunit would have followed in the absence 
of the decentralization policy. This is particularly problematic because decentralization almost always occurs in the 
midst of other major institutional and policy reforms (democratization, economic opening, end of conflict). There is 
simply no way to hold constant the multiple policy, economic, and socio-cultural changes taking place at the same 
time that could generate the same causal outcome. 
An alternative approach has been to leverage large cross-national datasets to search for patterns in the data. Do 
countries with greater amounts of authority invested to subunits demonstrate better economic performance, public 
service delivery, lower inequality, and better governance? Numerous studies have taken this approach, resulting in a 
wide range of diverse but often contradictory findings. Although most of the scholars behind these studies 
demonstrate great empirical savvy, their approach is ultimately hampered because decentralization is not 
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exogenously assigned across countries. States choose to decentralize for a variety of reasons: some hope to distance 
themselves from an authoritarian past (e.g. Indonesia); others hope to avoid civil conflict between regionally 
concentrated ethnic groups (e.g. Kosovo, the Czech Republic, and Russia (Hale 2004)); some face pressure from 
international financial institutions (Eaton 2004); some are accommodating electoral outcomes or the career 
aspirations of local officials (Grindle 2004); and still others expect economic benefits. If these decisions are 
correlated with the outcome variables, the underlying motivation may generate the causal outcome; decentralization 
may be just one of many policies symptomatic of the desire to achieve that goal.  
A final strand of the literature has sought to test particular implications of decentralization using randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) in which treatment is randomly assigned to a set of locations within a country, allowing the 
researcher to observe the effects of decentralization in the treatment group and compare the outcomes to a control 
group of similar units. This technique simultaneously resolves the problem of the missing counterfactual in the case-
study literature and the unobserved heterogeneity in the cross-national literature, as the experiment takes place 
within one country and scholars know that the assignment of the treatment is orthogonal to any underlying 
economic conditions or cultural factors within that one country. This work is just in its infancy, but it has begun to 
yield findings that question the logic of decentralization. Olken (2007), for instance, has used RCTs in Indonesia to 
demonstrate that participation in village councils is not associated with reductions in corruption. Humpreys et al. 
(2006) use an RCT to study how participatory processes may be influenced and coopted by local leaders.  
While RCTs such as these certainly represent a positive development in terms of their ability to isolate causal 
effects, on the question of decentralization they are often constrained by artificiality and political feasibility. 
“Accountability meetings” and comment cards designed to elicit community participation are often new innovations 
in the locations being researched. They did not preexist the experiment and will not continue afterward. Findings 
from studies like these therefore pose a challenge to government officials who are deciding to alter institutions with 
long histories in a given locality and impose a new set of institutional rules that citizens will perceive as permanent. 
It takes time for citizens to become accustomed to institutional processes, to learn how they work and how they can 
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best make use of them (Knight 1992). Moreover, the shadow of the future matters as well. The effort and time a 
citizen invests in using a new institution may be strongly related to how long he or she expects it to operate in his or 
her locality. Because of this, limited information can be drawn from mechanisms of decentralization that are only 
conceived and tested within the experimental setting. Another limitation of RCTs is that they are constrained to 
small settings, usually at the village level, by budget and political parameters. It is hard to imagine the political 
feasibility of an RCT trying to abolish a democratic institution at the district level, an experiment that could 
potentially affect millions of people. 
Ideally, then, researchers need experiments put forward by governments themselves that seek to test the impact 
of real institutions currently existing in the country or institutions that will be employed if the experiment proves 
successful.  Our study follows in this vein. In 2008, Vietnamese authorities sought to remove a local institution that 
had been enshrined in the 1992 Constitution and that had been empowered by a series of decentralization reforms 
thereafter. Because the removal was internally controversial and potentially unconstitutional, Vietnamese authorities 
chose to pilot the program in a limited sample, providing a unique opportunity to observe changes in treatment and 
control areas over time. We explore the motivation and selection processes for the recentralization pilot below. 
 
2. DPCs and Vietnam’s Government Hierarchy 
Vietnam’s government architecture has both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontally, the system is 
separated into executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. Vertically, the system consists of the central, provincial, 
district, and commune levels (Figure 1 reproduced from Fforde 2003).7 The horizontal division is then replicated at 
each subnational level, so that branches of the executive (People’s Committee), legislature (People’s Council), and 
judiciary (People’s Court/Procuracy) exist in every subnational unit in the country (Fforde 2003). Certainly, Vietnam 
is a single-party regime, so all government institutions are subordinate to the CPV at each level. In a combination of 
its French and Marxist-Leninist legacies, Vietnam follows a parliamentary system, which means that citizens vote to 
                                                          
7 Vietnam has 63 provinces and cities, 696 districts, and more than 11,000 communes. 
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elect their representatives in the legislative branch (National Assembly (NA) and People’s Councils (PCs)), who in 
turn elect the leadership of the executive branch and appoint the heads of the judiciary branch. Citizens vote to 
directly elect each of these legislative bodies at national, provincial, district, and commune elections. 
 
[Figure 1 about Here] 
 
District People’s Councils 
Districts, the focus of this paper, are intermediate administrative units, lower than provinces in the government 
hierarchy and higher than communes.8 In terms of function, DPCs perform three major tasks: appointing district 
personnel, making district policies, and overseeing district authorities.  
Under the first task, DPCs elect the executive branch of the district authority, which is the District People’s 
Committee (often abbreviated as DPCOM to distinguish from the elected councils). DPCs maintain the authority to 
elect or dismiss the chairperson and all members of the DPCOM. Members of DPCs have the ability to formally 
question the Chairperson of the DPCOM, as well as the heads of the procuracy, courts, and other district offices 
during DPC sessions. Under the second task, DPCs approve annual socio-economic development plans, determine 
the district budget, and make district policies in most public policy areas, including infrastructure, agricultural 
extension, education, and healthcare. DPCs make decisions by passing resolutions, which are conducted through 
majority-rule votes. Under the last task, DPCs oversee all of the government offices of communes within their 
borders. This oversight task includes reviewing periodic reports, making queries, reviewing legal documents, making 
oversight visits, and conducting votes of confidence. 
In terms of organization, DPCs have between 25 and 35 members, depending on the size of the district’s 
population.9 Each includes one chairperson, one vice chairperson, and several standing members, all of whom work 
                                                          
8 The average district population is roughly 120,000 people. 
9 This is stipulated by the 2003 Law on the Election of People’s Councils. See also Fforde (2003). 
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for the DPC on a full-time basis as part of the standing committee. Other members work part-time for the DPC 
(i.e. participate in DPC meetings) and have separate full-time jobs. DPCs have very limited authority to raise 
revenue on their own; funding and resources for DPC operations come mainly from provincial government 
budgets. 
Each DPC maintains a walk-in office, which is open daily to consider, receive, and respond to constituent 
requests. DPCs are expected to hold regular public meetings with constituents and report to them about the 
activities of the DPC and the District People’s Committee. Because of these functions, opponents of DPC removal 
often present an idealized version of DPCs as bastions of democracy (Nguyen Anh 2010). 
 
Limits on DPC Authority 
It is important not to exaggerate the importance of DPCs, which operate in a highly constrained political 
environment. The true amount of downward accountability to voters is highly disputed. Vietnam remains a single-
party regime, and candidates for public office are vetted by the CPV. While seats are contested by multiple 
candidates and turnout is high10 because voting is mandatory, it is not clear how much information Vietnamese 
citizens actually possess about the candidates or the district election process. In the 2011 UNDP-PAPI survey, only 
5.8% of citizens could correctly answer all three basic questions on a civics test of which institutions were subject to 
elections and the length of officials’ terms. 14.8% missed all three questions (UNDP-PAPI 2011). Rather than 
providing vertical accountability (O’Donnell 1994), low-quality elections and limited voter information allow DPCs 
to be captured by local elites who can nominate favored candidates for positions, manipulate candidate vetting in 
their favor, and use their informational advantage to make sure their choices are elected (Malesky and Schuler 2011). 
Because these same local elites are also represented on the DPCOM, the DPC has a very hard time fulfilling its 
oversight role of the local executive (Vu 2012, p19; Van Arkadie et al. 2010, p155). As Van Arkadie et al (2010) 
                                                          
10 The UNDP-PAPI (2012) found that 68% participated in the 2012 election, with 10% answering no, and 21% 
refusing to answer. 
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colorfully put it in a review of Vietnam’s decentralization efforts, “Local government is seldom transparent; so that 
decentralization has sometimes seemed to have resulted in a kind of bureaucratic patrimonial localism (p185).” 
Prior to the pilot, DPCs were considered to be paper tigers by most analysts of local governance (Kerkvliet 
2004). As in China, DPC officials are generally party members and therefore must be accountable to party superiors 
in their district and province, which limits their decision-making authority (Whiting 2004). By convention, the 
district Party Secretary usually serves as Chair or Vice-Chair of the DPC as well, allowing the local party to influence 
DPC decision-making. In addition, full DPCs only meet twice a year and are represented by small standing 
committees when out of session. Finally, the DPC is only one of three assemblies that operate at the local level, so 
their initiatives must consider the framework imposed by Provincial PCs and anticipate the implementation of 
Commune PCs. Together, these limitations bias against finding a significant effect of the removal treatment.  
 
Removal of DPCs 
The idea of abolishing DPCs was proposed from the top down. In August 2007, the Central Committee of the 
CPV debated and passed Resolution 17-NQ/TW, directing the government to take stronger action regarding public 
and local government reform. The resolution pointed out the problems of the current public administrative system 
in Vietnam, and hinted that it was facilitating abuses, waste, and hold-up problems created by local leaders: 
“Our public administration has many limitations and weaknesses… The functions and responsibilities of 
various bodies within the public administration system are vague, overlapping and missing; the state 
hierarchy is burdensome and inappropriate. The qualifications of the cadre and officials do not meet the 
requirements; red tape and waste are pervasive. Institutions and regulations for public finance management 
have many problems” (Central Committee of CPV 2007, p1). 
One of the main solutions laid out in Resolution 17 was to abolish DPCs and simplify current district 
governments into provincial government administrative agencies for handling district tasks (p. 8-9). However, this 
solution faced considerable objection by the central government, VNA, local authorities, and mass media. 
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Opponents of this solution pointed out that DPCs are a key democratic institution for promoting the interests of 
local populations. Pham Minh Tuyen, Chairman of the National Assembly’s Committee for Delegate Activities, 
asked: “Who would examine and keep checks on the administration at the same level? Wouldn’t increasing 
members of the Provincial People’s Council and increasing meeting times also add extra costs to the budget?” 
Objections were also registered in the highest echelons of the political hierarchy, including by the Vice Chairman of 
the National Assembly, Nguyen Duc Kien (Nguyen Anh 2010). 
On the other side of the debate, supporters of the removal emphasized the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of 
DPCs, claiming that the time, money, human resources, compromises, and impasses involved in DPC deliberations 
were considerable. Pham Phuong Thao, Chairwoman of the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Council, estimated that the 
removal of each DPC in Ho Chi Minh City would save up to $85,000 each year (Pham Thao 2008). Furthermore, 
Vietnam had four such representative bodies, raising the question of whether the cost of maintaining DPCs was 
justified by the benefits (Nguyen Thao 2010; Van Tat Thu 2010). Removal advocates pointed out that DPC 
functions could easily be handled by “upper and lower bodies” (Nguyen Thao 2010).  
When resolution could not be reached in the debate, a consensus quickly emerged that the impact of DPCs was 
essentially an empirical question that should be addressed by experimentation. 
 
3. Experimentation with DPC Removal 
In December 2008, the National Assembly passed Resolution 26, allowing for the piloting of DPC removal. 
Given its paramount importance, the government created a National Steering Committee headed by the Prime 
Minister to coordinate this institutional experiment. Under the direction of the National Steering Committee, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and various government agencies actively prepared for the launch of the policy 
experiment (GSRV 2009).  
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Selection of Treatment 
MOHA was given the task of designing the pilot in order to “provide an objective and scientific evaluation of 
DPC removal (GSRV 2009, p1).” One of the key issues in the design was the selection of the treatment group. 
Researchers from MOHA conducted a series of workshops across the country to receive input from policymakers, 
social scientists, and the public. They then came up with a set of selection criteria, which they presented and on 
which they received feedback from line ministries and committees of the VNA. In January 2009, the government 
submitted a proposal to the VNA, which laid out four criteria for the selection of the treatment group: 
1. The sample size of the treatment should be sufficient for scientific evaluation of impact.11 
2. The sampling should be stratified by region and subregion of the country. 
3. The sampling should be stratified by city versus rural, lowland versus highland, midland versus 
internationally bordered land. 
4. The sampling should be stratified by socio-economic and public administration performance. 
Upon reviewing this proposal, the Standing Committee of the VNA passed Resolution 724, listing ten provinces 
(99 districts) in the treatment group, which had been selected according the four criteria above. The remaining 53 
provinces (498 districts) would serve as the control group. Figure 2 demonstrates how the selection was stratified by 
subregion and national-level city.  
[Figure 2 about Here] 
While the MOHA researchers were careful, the experiment is certainly not an RCT. Consequently, it is 
important to assess whether the treatment and control groups are balanced on observable characteristics. Such 
information would provide tentative evidence that the selection criteria were exogenous to the outcomes and 
therefore that the intervention can be treated as a quasi-experiment (Dunning 2008).12 Table 1 provides a balance 
                                                          
11 The statistical power calculated by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) indicated that the treatment sample 
size should be around 16% of the total localities in the country (GSRV 2009). 
12 A more stringent test would consider whether the process approximates “as if” randomness and therefore can be 
considered a “natural experiment” (Dunning 2008).  
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table of 46 economic, natural, demographic, governance, infrastructural, and legal indicators, measured prior to the 
intervention. The first two columns show the simple means of the two groups in these indicators. Since national-
level cities13 were oversampled to test whether the experiment was applicable in urban settings, they comprise 30% 
of the treatment group and only 4% of the control group. Consequently, the treatment provinces appear to perform 
better in several areas. When excluding national-level cities, however, the differences between the two groups 
virtually disappear.  
[Table 1 about Here] 
In addition to cities, MOHA also stratified their selection by region, so to ensure that each of the country’s 
seven regions was represented (excluding the Central Highlands for security reasons). This makes it necessary to 
perform a true balance test within each region, as if analyzing an RCT with a stratification strategy. To this end, we 
regress these 46 indicators on the treatment dummy and control for two key criteria used for stratification (national-
level city and region-fixed effect). Column ‘P-treatment’ in Table 1 reports the p-values of treatment in these 46 
regressions and shows that the treatment is not significantly correlated with 45 of these characteristics. In other 
words, the balance between the treatment and control groups seems to be as good as in stratified randomization, at 
least in all observable dimensions. 
Selection based on unobservables is a possibility, as MOHA may have selected leaders that were considered 
more pliant or more likely to implement successfully. Because of the approach, we can never know for certain, but 
we do test to see whether the treatment provinces differ on leadership questions used in the Vietnamese Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI), an annual survey of 10,000 Vietnamese firms (Malesky 2009). These questions are 
included in the governance panel of Table 1. We find no evidence that the 2008 respondents thought their 
provincial leaders were better at working within the law, more creative and clever, or more likely to risk punishment 
than leaders of control provinces.  
                                                          
13 They are metropolises with the status of provinces: Treatment: (Hai Phong Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City); 
Control (Ha Noi and Can Tho). 
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Implementing the Pilot Intervention 
Following Resolution 26 of the VNA, the Government and Ministries issued a series of documents guiding the 
DPC abolishment experiment. The 2004-2009 DPC term ended on April 25, 2009, and DPC elections were not 
held in experimental locations after this date. The existing personnel of DPCs had their responsibilities transferred 
to executive People’s Committees in the same districts or provinces. The three existing functions of DPCs were 
transferred to different government bodies. The selection and dismissal of DPC personnel was assigned upward to 
Provincial People’s Committees, which were also charged with appointing the new body. Policy-making and budget-
approval functions were also transferred to the Provincial People’s Committees. Finally, general oversight was 
transferred to the Provincial People’s Councils. This transfer of power clearly implies that the nesting of districts 
within provinces will impact our ability to draw correct inferences, and that districts cannot be considered as 
independently drawn. 
The abolition of the DPC system could have critical implications for public services and programs as well as for 
general wellbeing within each district. As we discuss in Section 1, the theoretical literature does not provide a clear 
guide as to whether this abolition would lead to improvement or deterioration of public services and governance at 
the district and commune levels. 
 
4. Our Empirical Design 
To analyze whether DPC abolishment improved public service delivery, we take advantage of a unique panel 
dataset that allows for a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) analysis on key outcome variables considered 
important by local and national leaders. 
 
Data Source 
To ensure reliable estimates of local performance over time, we use commune data from the three most recent 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 2006, 2008, and 2010. These surveys were conducted by 
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the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from the World Bank. The 2006 and 2008 
VHLSSs use the 1999 Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame, while the 2010 VHLSS uses the 2009 
Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame. 
The VHLSS has two components. The first is a stratified welfare survey of around 9,000 households. In 
addition, research teams are instructed to collect “hard data” from commune leaders and are provided a checklist to 
help gauge whether basic services are being met, such as whether or not the commune has a post office or an 
agricultural extension center. Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2,280, 2,219, and 2,199 
randomly selected rural communes in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 surveys, respectively. Commune data includes 
information on commune demography as well as on general economic conditions and aid programs, non-farm 
employment, agriculture production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health and health facilities, 
and social problems in the communes. Importantly, the commune dataset only includes rural communes, omitting 
the ward, the equivalent bureaucratic unit within cities. All analysis, therefore, only studies the impact of 
recentralization on rural localities using the hard data collected from communes.14 
 
Estimation methods 
To examine the effect of the removal of People’s Councils, we employ a difference-in-differences estimator and 
commune data from the 2008 and 2010 VHLSSs using the following specification:  
,ititittittit XDTDTY εδθγβα +++++=  
where Yit is the outcome of rural commune i at time t. Tt is a dummy time variable that equals 1 for 2010 and 0 
for 2008, the baseline year before the treatment commenced in 2009; the 2010 year is the follow-up year after 
                                                          
14 More technically, Vietnam divides communes into three categories: 1) rural communes (xa); 2) rural district 
capitals (thi tran); and 3) urban wards (phuong). Category 3 is not covered by the VHLSS rural data. Urban, however 
is a slippery concept and some peri-urban areas certainly sneak back into the sample in two ways. First, all five 
national-level cities include both wards and rural communes, which are more urbanized and densely populated than 
the average huyen. Secondly, thi tran can be highly developed and populated in some areas. Dropping peri-urban 
areas from the analysis does not alter our results. 
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treatment implementation. Dit is the treatment variable that equals 1 for communes that had their DPCs abolished 
and 0 otherwise. We interact Tt and Dit to produce the coefficient θ, which is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
of the treatment on commune outcomes over time. Xit is a vector of control variables that are employed to capture 
minor imbalances in commune characteristics resulting from the fact that the VHLSS commune sampling strategy 
was not perfectly aligned with the DPC experiment.  
The nested nature of the data poses a unique challenge. Communes can certainly not be treated as independent 
as they are clustered within districts, which control important financial and administrative decisions. The standard 
approach in such a situation is to cluster standard errors at the treatment level (the district), which will limit biases 
caused by the correlation of errors within a unit. The nature of the selection process, however, poses an additional 
conundrum. The selection of all districts within ten provinces (with only limited exceptions) implies an additional 
level of clustering that must be taken into account, especially as the district responsibilities had by that time been 
transferred upward to the provincial councils. To deal with this problem, we adopt the multiway clustering 
technique of Cameron et al. (2011), which allows us to address the correlation of errors among communes at both 
the district and provincial levels simultaneously.15 
Choosing the appropriate dependent variable for the analysis is also not trivial. As Treisman (2007, Chapter 11) 
notes, the analyst’s choice of variable for gauging public service delivery has critical implications for whether 
decentralization is deemed successful. Kramon and Posner (2012) lodge a similar complaint about the cherry-
picking of dependent variables in analyses of redistributive politics. To avoid this temptation, we employ as many 
outcome variables as we can find in the VHLSS that meet two criteria: 1) They are in areas under the authority of 
DPCs according to the 2003 Law on the Organization of People’s Councils and People’s Committees 
(infrastructure, communication, public health, education, agricultural extension services); and 2) They are factors 
                                                          
15 Implemented using STATA’s ivreg2 procedure. In an even more conservative approach, we also re-run the core 
analyses only at the province level, as this is where selection occurred. This approach is risky because of the limited 
degrees of freedom provided by 58 provinces. Despite the limited precision of the estimates, however, we find 
similar results for all aggregate indices. Please see Online Appendix F for provincial-level results on aggregate 
indices.  
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that could possibly be altered by local leadership within the one-year time frame under investigation. For instance, 
measures of household wealth and productivity are available, but it is hard to imagine that district policies could 
radically alter the career choices and income streams of respondents within one year. We identify thirty outcome 
variables that fit these criteria, employing the exact same specification for all of them.16 
As noted above, provincial selection was stratified, so treatments are representative of every region (except the 
Central Highlands) and national-level city by design.17 As suggested by Bruhn and Mackenzie (2009), we include 
dummy variables for regions and cities in order to ensure that these design choices do not lead to over-estimation of 
treatment effects. Other control variables include commune location and population density. It should be noted that 
control variables should not be affected by the treatment variable, i.e., the removal of the People’s Councils in our 
case (Heckman et al. 1999; Angrist and Pischke 2008). Thus we limit control variables to more exogenous variables 
where minimal non-balance has been detected at the commune level. Our results are robust to eliminating these 
controls. 
Table 2 presents the regressions of commune outcomes on time, treatment, and interaction between time and 
the treatment variable, as well as other control variables for the first seven of the selected outcome variables.18 We 
provide mean values of the dependent variable in 2008 in order to estimate the amount of room available for 
improvement. The highlighted row (time*treatment) depicts the ATE for our analysis. In this set of outcome 
variables, we find that the ATE was positive and statistically significant. For instance, all-year roads have grown 
8.7% faster in the treatment than in the control group; public transportation has grown 10.2% faster. Of course, not 
                                                          
16 A listing of the exact wording used on the data collection instrument for each indicator is included in Appendix 
C2. 
17 We dropped observations from the Central Highland regions, since the government did not conduct the 
experiment of the People’s Council removal in this region.  A dummy is needed for national-level city, as these 
predominantly urban metropolises also include rural districts (huyen) that are included in the VHLSS survey but 
have access to services that are different from rural districts in rural provinces. 
18 Please see Online Appendix C1 for descriptive statistics for all independent and dependent variables used in the 
analysis. Online Appendix D provides the full set of thirty regression results. 
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all outcome variables were significant, but as Figure 3 shows, the experiment revealed a disproportionately high 
number of positive effects.  
[Table 2 about Here] 
In Figure 3, we present the ATE along with a 90% confidence interval. Intervals that do not cross the dashed 
line are significantly different from zero. ATE results are organized by type of public service. Here, we see that the 
effect of District People’s Council removal is statistically significant for 11 out of 30 outcomes (over one third!), 
nine of which are in a positive direction. Such a large number of significant findings would not be predicted by 
frequentist statistics, an inference to which we return below. 
[Figure 3 about Here] 
A few additional patterns emerge from careful inspection. The treatment appears to have been particularly 
successful at improving transportation infrastructure (road, public transport, and socio-economic projects), 
communication infrastructure (television broadcasting and post offices), and health care (assistance with fees and 
public health projects). Under the current law, DPCs have the authority to shape local policies and decisions in 
these sectors. The effects we find here suggest that removing such authority actually improves these public services. 
Most other outcome variables, particularly educational measures and agricultural extension, did not show significant 
improvement. On two outcomes, the treatment had a deleterious effect. Treatment provinces were less likely to 
have business credits and veterinary visits.  
To probe these aggregate patterns more directly, we construct six additive indices for: 1) transportation 
infrastructure; 2) agricultural support services; 3) public health services; 4) education services; 5) communication 
infrastructure; and 6) support for household business development. The variables can be identified directly under 
the respective headings, which are capitalized in Figure 3. The indexing strategy is as conservative as possible, 
simply a sum of all the dichotomous measures. In a few cases, the variable under investigation is continuous (e.g. 
the share of households receiving credit). In these cases, we re-scale the variable to range between 0 and 1 and add it 
to the index. We then re-run the diff-in-diff analysis on the six additive indices. The results can be seen in Panel 1 of 
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Table 3. The results confirm H2. Removing DPCs definitely generated positive improvements for districts in areas 
that were of strategic importance to central leaders (infrastructure and public health). These results are quite 
substantial and statistically significant. In areas where citizens may have preferred more assistance, the treatment 
appears to have been less effective (agriculture, education, and household business development). While individual 
indicators prove significant in each one, these are undermined by lack of improvement in other areas. 
<Table 3 About Here> 
5. Robustness Tests 
At first blush, the findings appear compelling and confirm that recentralization can improve the efficiency of 
public service delivery (H1), especially in arenas that are of explicit importance to the central government (H2). 
Nevertheless, the nature of selection and the implementation of the rollout pose a number of threats to validity. In 
this section we tackle these threats one by one: 1) The Parallel Paths Assumption; 2) Spurious Correlation; 3) Motivated 
Interference by Central Officials; and 4) Hawthorne Effects. 
 
The Parallel Paths Assumption 
The diff-in-diff estimator identifies the impact of the treatment under the assumption that the unobserved 
difference between the treatment and control groups is time-constant between survey rounds. In other words, we 
should not observe differential trending between treatment and control groups in the same direction as in the 
experiment in prior periods. We test this assumption by running diff-in-diff regressions using commune data from 
the 2006 and 2008 VHLSSs. The two surveys were conducted before the intervention in 2009, and therefore we 
should expect that the effect of the interaction between the time and treatment variables should not be statistically 
significant. The lower panel of Table 3 depicts the results of this analysis for the six aggregate indices,19 which 
confirm the assumptions of the model. Only two out of 30 outcome variables are significant and positive in the pre-
treatment period. In only one case is the ATE for an index statistically significant, but it is in the wrong direction. 
                                                          
19 Full results for all thirty dependent variables are available in Online Appendix D. 
 
25 
 
Infrastructure was actually worse for treatment provinces before the removal of DPCs. For instance, road quality 
improved at a slower rate in treatment than control provinces between 2006 and 2008, so that treatment provinces 
were starting from a slight deficit at the time of the intervention. A few individual variables also demonstrate this 
pattern, but these deficits should only make it more difficult to identify effects of the treatment. Far more 
dangerous would be positive trending continuing into the experimental period, which would lead to bias in the 
treatment effect coefficient. We observe no such cases, however, indicating that pre-experiment trending in the 
treatment provinces did not contribute to the results observed in 2010.20 
 
Randomization Inference Test 
Another empirical concern is that the effects of the treatment are simply the result of a lucky draw from the 
universe of possible outcome variables. In other words, a critic might conjecture that there is nothing special about 
the treatment at all. If we simply repeat the analysis post-hoc and randomly assign a “treatment” across the 
observed differences, 11 significant outcomes would be well within the range of possible outcomes.  
To this end, we conduct a randomization inference test, where we perform 1000 Monte Carlo Simulations, 
randomly assigning an artificial treatment and then regressing outcome variables on our treatment with the exact 
same specification used above. Figure 4 presents the results of this analysis. Here, we show the number of total 
significant and significantly positive outcomes observed in the DPC experiment (long-dashed line), the pre-
treatment 2006-2008 analysis (short-dashed line), and each Monte Carlo simulation. Notice that while the pre-
treatment trends fall well within the range of significant outcomes that could be obtained by pure chance, the DPC 
experimental results were not reached in a single one of the 1000 simulations.21  
[Figure 4 about here] 
                                                          
20 Online Appendix E tests the parallel paths assumption using only provincial-level aggregates as well. 
21 See Online Appendix G for further elaboration of this test. 
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The DPC experiment’s positive effect on public service delivery cannot be brushed aside as pure coincidence. It 
seems quite clear that abolishing the elected council improved the efficiency-important set of public services, 
supporting H2. 
 
Motivated Interference by Central Officials 
Skeptics might argue that central officials wanted the experiment to be successful and, despite pretending to be 
careful about selection, actually manipulated the results by providing greater resources to the treatment group. This 
bias would explain the positive results but destroy our ability to draw theoretical inferences regarding the impact of 
recentralization. To test for such interference, we collect data on direct and indirect central transfers to each 
province between 2006 and 2012. If transfers diverged significantly between treatment and control groups over this 
period, this would provide strong evidence of elite manipulation of the experiment.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 5. Panel 1 presents the trend in total transfers per capita over 
time, where treatment provinces are depicted with straight lines and control provinces with dashed lines. Panels 2 
and 3 divide overall transfers into non-targeted (or equalizing) transfers (to make up for local budget deficits) and 
targeted transfers for central government programs in infrastructure, poverty alleviation, and environment. Finally, 
Panel 4 depicts the share of provincial own-source revenue that the location is allowed to retain. Eleven wealthy 
provinces must share between 75% and 10% of own-source revenue with the central government, providing an 
implicit transfer that is embedded in the target amount. In all four cases, we can see clearly that control provinces 
received a greater share of resources per capita over the entire period under investigation, beginning in 2006 before 
the experiment and continuing afterward. While all four charts show increases in transfers after the experiment, 
there is no evidence at all suggesting that special treatment was given to treatment locations. A t-test provided in the 
legend provides additional confirmation, showing that treatment provinces did not receive statistically significant 
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increases in any form of transfers between 2008 and 2010.  We also investigate a tranche of funds available to the 
Vietnamese Government for special projects to see if they were employed in a biased manner.22 
Vietnam also engages in indirect transfers to subnational governments through state-owned banks and centrally 
managed state-owned conglomerates (Pincus et al. 2012). State-owned banks do not release their lending portfolios, 
but it is commonly estimated that 70% of their loans go to SOEs (Malesky and Taussig 2009). Because we cannot 
access state-owned bank balance sheets, we rely on firm-level data from the GSO Enterprise Census over the 
research period. Using the annual census, we create measures of aggregate liabilities held by centrally managed 
SOEs in the province as a proxy for state bank lending in Panel 5.  We also track ‘owner’ equity, which gives us a 
sense of the share of capital introduced to the SOE through the national budget in Panel 6.23 We standardize both 
figures by nominal, provincial GDP. Treatment provinces do have larger average allocations of state lending and 
slightly higher owner equity over the research time period. There is no evidence, however, of disproportionate 
increases in these figures. In fact, liabilities in the control group actually grew at a faster rate after 2008. 
<Figure 5 about Here> 
Hawthorne Effects 
A related concern is known as the Hawthorne effect, whereby a treatment group experiences gains not because 
of the experiment, but because they received special treatment and observation (French 1950). In the Vietnamese 
case, this may have come in the form of a special unit from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) observing 
progress. Fortunately, a limited budget prevented MOHA from evaluating all ten treatment provinces. Rather, they 
chose to evaluate and survey citizens from five treatment and five control provinces, allowing us to disentangle the 
effect of having central officials in suits roaming the province from the actual effects of DPC removal.24  
                                                          
22 Results are available in Online Appendix K. 
23 In addition, we collect data on Central SOE investments, assets, and new construction outlays. These are 
presented in Online Appendix L. Results are very similar to these measures. 
24 The MOHA evaluation teams visited five treatment provinces (Lao Cai, Nam Dinh, Quang Tri, Da Nang, 
HCMC) and five control provinces (Yen Bai, Thai Binh, Quang Binh, Can Tho, Ha Noi). MOHA was careful to 
match these control locations on most descriptive characteristics. Each of the evaluation groups includes three 
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To test for Hawthorne effects, we replicate the analysis in Section 4 but with a slight twist – we impose a triple 
interaction of time, treatment, and whether the province received a MOHA delegation to survey citizens (survey). 
These results can be observed in Table 4. Panel 1 reports the regression coefficients. The first thing to notice is the 
interaction term (time*treatment), as this term represents the treatment effect without the contamination of MOHA 
visitors. Even though only five treatment provinces were surveyed, making statistical significance more difficult to 
achieve, the ATE remains sizable and positive for transportation, health, and communication. Moreover, it is still 
strongly significant for health and communication, indicating that MOHA visitors did not influence these results. 
[Table 4 about Here] 
Two further differences are critical for assessing whether Hawthorne effects inhibit the experiment. First and 
most important is the set of ten treatment provinces. If the provinces that received MOHA delegations within that 
treatment group significantly out-perform the non-treatment provinces, this would be evidence of bias. We can 
conclude that this is not the case. The coefficient on the triple interaction (time*treatment*survey), which is the effect 
of the survey in treated provinces, is not significant for all six indices. This indicates that the visit did not have any 
special effect on the final ATEs observed in Section 4. A secondary test involves comparing the control group that 
was surveyed to the control provinces that were not surveyed. If surveyed provinces outperform other control 
locations, this would be a cause for concern, as it would suggest that the visiting delegation generated additional 
effort from local leaders. Once again, we can rest assured that this is not the case.  
Certainly, with such a small number of province-level units, statistical significance may not be particularly 
compelling. Consequently, we calculate the predicted effects for each of the cells generated by the experimental 
conditions in Panel 2 for the six aggregate indices. Probing further into the three indices where the DPC experiment 
appeared to be most effective (transportation, health, communication), we find that the score of the treatment 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
provinces and two national-level cities, and provinces are matched by region, including one province each from the 
Northern Mountains, Red River Delta, and North Central Coast. 
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group that did not receive a MOHA delegation is actually higher than that of the group that was visited. In other 
words, provinces that received a MOHA delegation did marginally worse, not better. 
In sum, after repeated robustness tests, it is clear that the removal of DPCs had a significant impact on the 
delivery of public services that were most important to central officials. This is a surprising result that offers a useful 
corrective to the extant decentralization literature. 
 
6. Testing the Causal Mechanism- Unblocking Political Capture 
Three general mechanisms may explain the above results. First, DPC abolition may have reduced citizen 
influence over policies, allowing the center to drive through its favorite initiatives. A second basket of mechanisms 
can be grouped under the heading of bureaucratic restructuring possibly leading to efficiency improvements. DPC 
removal eliminated a key veto point in the implementation of central policies, but maintained other assemblies to 
capture citizen views. In addition, oversight of DPCOMs was shifted to provincial authorities, substituting upward 
accountability for horizontal accountability to the DPC. Third, DPC removal reduced capture of the decision-
making process by local elites, who had exploited the extra veto point to hold up central programs in exchange for a 
share of the rents and demanded bribes from citizens trying to comply with regulatory procedures. The capture 
story combines elements of the first two mechanisms, as it requires imperfectly implemented local elections in the 
control group and bureaucratic restructuring in the treatment group that shifts accountability upward and unblocks 
decision-making. 
Unfortunately, the research design was not fine-grained enough to reveal for certain which mechanism 
generated the underlying findings. In an ideal experimental setting, one could disentangle these mechanisms, but in 
this project, the fact that only one treatment occurred means we can only speculate. One way to advance the 
discussion, however, is to test the observable implications of the above mechanisms. Specifically, the diff-in-diff 
analysis generated a number of downstream puzzles: 1) Why did DPC removal expedite progress on central 
priorities without a discernible negative effect on policies favored by citizens? 2) Why was rapid progress made on 
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projects with relatively long gestation periods (i.e. all-year roads, post offices)? 3) Why was the achievement of 
control provinces worse on nearly all services than that of the pilot group, despite transfers to control provinces? 
Where did the money not spent on public services go? 
Removal of vertical accountability to citizens cannot answer the first question. Control provinces should have 
had better performance on services favored by citizens; instead, we observe non-effects of the treatment on the 
aggregate indices and sporadic positive performance on individual indicators. Bureaucratic restructuring can answer 
the first two questions, but it provides only a partial answer to the third. Provincial oversight may reduce waste, but 
it does not answer the question of why the horizontal accountability of executives to DPCs in the control group was 
unsuccessful.  In addition, we were unable to find evidence for two potential tracers of a pure bureaucratic 
restructuring story. The pilot did not appear to effect the distribution of service delivery among districts or the 
turnover of local leaders, as might have been expected from increased provincial authority over district policies.25 
One causal mechanism, however, provides an answer for all three puzzles – the elite capture mechanism. DPC 
removal did not impact progress on citizens’ service preferences because the DPCs in both treatment and control 
were not acting on behalf of voters in the first place. Policy was being directed to an elite group of local decision-
makers. Rapid progress could be made on long-term projects, because capture was holding up implementation of 
central-level projects that were “shovel ready” (e.g. Chinh Trung 2011; Tri Tin 2013). They had already been 
decided upon at the highest levels and just needed local authorities to approve and pass the appropriate 
implementing documents. The conflict between local elites and central policymakers can be intense, dampening 
project implementation (Tuan Ngoc 2009) and public scrutiny of local projects (Nguoi Dua Tin 2012). A post-pilot 
report from the Da Nang People’s Committee (2012), for instance, credits reductions in decision delays and 
administrative expenses for improved service delivery. Finally, transfers were higher to control provinces without 
                                                          
25 See Online Appendices I and J for regressions of public service inequality and leadership turnover on the 
treatment. 
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corresponding improvement on other public services because of corruption. Money was leaking out of the projects 
into the hands of district officials (Le Anh 2012).   
The answer to the third puzzle provides an additional observable implication to study. If DPC removal 
unblocked elite capture of the policy-making apparatus, we should observe lower corruption in treatment provinces. 
There is both qualitative and quantitative support for this theory. As the VNA debate about DPCs was taking place, 
a joint team of foreign and Vietnamese experts showed that decentralization in Vietnam had been unsuccessful in 
terms of its stated goals (p. 18) and led to the uneven allocation of public services, particularly regarding 
infrastructure (p. 102) and healthcare (p. 144) (Van Arkadie et al. 2010). The report concluded that the main reason 
for the disappointing results was corruption, claiming that decentralization produced, “unaccountable and corrupt 
local institutions that respond inadequately to public needs” (183).  
To study increased corruption quantitatively, we shift our attention to an alternative dataset. The UNDP-PAPI 
Survey (13,642 total respondents, 9,452 in rural districts) was specifically designed to measure quality of governance 
at the local level (UNDP 2011).26 One battery of PAPI asks respondents to reflect on corruption in their locality. 
The questions look at multiple forms of petty bribery, but three questions in particular give us insight into the state 
capture mechanism: 1) Leaders’ diversion of state funds for personal use; 2) The use of kickbacks on government 
construction contracts; and 3) The necessity of bribery for obtaining government positions. The full wording for 
these questions is available in Table 5, where we study the difference between control and treatment groups in 
relation to their leaders’ behavior. 
Because PAPI only surveyed the full set of provinces in 2011, we cannot perform a diff-in-diff analysis; rather, 
we simply look at the differences in the average effect between the control and treatment groups. As with VHLSS, 
we maintain regional and national-level city effects with a few exogenous controls for respondent-level covariates 
that could plausibly be correlated with outcomes (the sex, age, and ethnicity of each respondent, whether the 
respondent holds a government job, and individual wealth). To remain consistent with VHLSS analysis, we: 1) Drop 
                                                          
26 See http://www.papi.vn/about-papi for a detailed description of the PAPI methodology. 
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all observations from the Central Highlands, which did not participate in the experiment; 2) Analyze only rural 
districts; 3) Employ regional and national-city dummy variables; and 4) Use robust standard errors, clustered at both 
the province and district levels. All results are robust to removing all control variables.27 
In Table 5, we present the results of the capture analysis. Responses are re-coded to create a dichotomous 
variable that combines “Agree” and “Somewhat Agree” into a single value of “Agree.” This facilitates interpretation 
and the use of a linear probability model.28 The treatment is significantly associated with lower corruption in all 
three categories. In treated provinces, officials are 10% less likely to divert public funds, 8% less likely to expect 
kickbacks on corruption procurement, and 13% less likely to pay a bribe to obtain a government job. The results are 
a strong confirmation that recentralization, under the specific setting of a single-party authoritarian regime, can 
reduce local capture caused by imperfect elections. 
[Table 5 about Here] 
 Because the PAPI is a single-shot survey of citizen perspectives, the above results cannot be subjected to the 
rigor of a diff-in-diff design. We address this limitation with a literal ‘nearest neighbor’ matching strategy, where we 
identify the two nearest districts across the border in non-treated provinces. We trim the control group to these 
proximate communes, providing greater balance on district characteristics. We report the results in Models 3, 6, and 
9, finding that the results are actually strengthened by the more demanding approach. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite a fruitful decades-long theoretical debate, the literature on decentralization has stagnated in recent years 
as scholars have encountered a range of empirical problems rendering causal identification difficult, if not 
impossible. The Vietnamese pilot project to remove DPCs in ninety-nine districts nicely resolves these problems for 
                                                          
27 As an initial step, we first test whether the two datasets are compatible by regressing a series of variables from the 
PAPI that capture the same public service delivery questions used in the VHLSS. The treatment is strongly 
associated with these variables, indicating that the public service findings are consistent across two completely 
independent datasets. Results are available in Appendix H. 
28 We make the transformation for presentation and consistency, but all results are robust to using OLS or an 
ORPOBIT on the three-point scale. 
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the following reasons: 1) It has a well-defined control group, allowing within-country comparison; 2) The timing of 
the experiment’s introduction was exogenous to outcomes; and 3) The intervention involved a real-world institution 
that had existed as part of the polity since 1992. In short, it provides the ideal research design for studying the 
impact of subnational political and financial empowerment. Moreover, the experiment provides the first controlled 
analysis of recentralization, an institutional change that will likely become more common as the pendulum swings 
back from the misplaced euphoria of the mid-nineties. Our analysis reveals that the removal of Vietnamese DPCs 
significantly improved a wide range of public services that were favored by central authorities (roads, healthcare, and 
communications). Services favored by local citizens (education, agriculture, small business support), however, did 
not benefit from decentralization. Further analysis reveals that the most likely mechanism for the improved 
performance was that the pilot unblocked local capture of district policy-making, thereby releasing halted projects 
and reducing corruption. More generally, the capture result shows how imperfectly implemented local elections can 
ultimately undermine quality of governance and service delivery. 
As in all projects, there are important limitations to generalizing from the Vietnamese experience. Selection of 
the treatment was not randomized, so unobserved targeting remains a possibility. The pilot took place in a single-
party authoritarian setting that has traditionally struggled with local implementation of central initiatives. Thus, we 
are cautious about generalizing the findings to settings with truly democratic elections at the central or local level. 
Moreover, there are questions of the breadth of our conclusions. The pilot is still ongoing, and long-term effects 
may be different from the medium-term results we identify. Finally, there is potential for fallacy of composition – 
what may work in the pilot may not be true for all districts, especially as future recentralization forces the central 
government to make difficult decisions about the allocation of resources for public goods.  
These limitations aside, however, this paper provides a positive advance in our understanding of recentralization 
in settings with imperfect local elections. 
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Figure 1: Organization of the Vietnamese Political System Based on the Revised 1992 Constitution  
According to Fforde (2003), a leadership relationship means the superior body provides formal direction and/or appoints the 
leadership. A supervisory relationship implies that the lower body must report to and receive guidance from the superior 
institution. Source: Reproduced from Fforde (2003). 
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Figure 2: Map of Treatment Provinces and National-Level Cities 
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Figure 3: Difference in Difference Analysis of Key Outcome Variables. This figure shows the Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) of district removal. The results are derived from the fully specified difference-in-difference regression models in Table 
2 and Online Appendix D, with each variable listed on the y-index used as the dependent variable in a separate regression. 
Dependent variables are organized into six groups: 1) Infrastructure Index (measuring quality of transportation infrastructure); 
2) Agricultural (Agr.) Services Index (measuring access to agricultural extension programs and credit); 3) Health Services Index 
(measuring quality of public health services); 4) Education Index (measuring access to and quality of public education); 5) 
Communications Index (measuring post office and telecommunication infrastructure); and 6) HH Biz Dev’t Index (measuring 
household business development services, such as credit access and markets).  
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Figure 4: Randomization Inference Test on Total Number of Significant Outcomes - Comparison of Treatment to 
Monte Carlo Estimation with 1000 Simulations. Note: Long dashes show number of significant outcomes from actual 
treatment (2008 to 2010; see Online Appendix D for full results). Short dashes show number of significant outcomes from 
pre-treatment trending (2006 to 2008; see Online Appendix E for full results). 
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Figure 5: Test of Motivated Interference in Experimental Performance– Comparison of per capita transfers and state 
investment from the central government to control and treatment groups between 2006 and 2012. The treatment group is 
represented by solid lines and the control group by dashed lines. 90% are also presented for each year for both treatment (light 
gray) and control dark gray. T-tests are of the growth in all four variables between 2008 and 2010.  Each panel studies a 
different type of transfer: Panel 1: total transfers (per capita) in millions of VND; Panels 2: equalizing transfers to make up for 
budget deficits; Panel 3 target transfers for socio-economic development programs (infrastructure, agriculture, environment, 
and poverty alleviation); Panel 4: Share of own-source revenue that can be retained by the province; Panel 5: Liabilities held by 
Central State Owned Enterprises (CSOEs) located in the province over provincial GDP; Panel 6: Central state equity held by 
CSOEs in province over provincial GDP.  Source: MOF (2006 to 2012) Source: GSO (2006-2011). 
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6. State Equity in Central SOEs
 
48 
 
Table 1: Balance between Ten Treatment Provinces and the Rest of the Country Based on 2008, Pre-Treatment Data 
 
  
Variable Control Treatment T-Statistic P-Value T-Statistic P-Value  Β Treatment P-Treatment  Β City P-City R-Squared
EconomicGDP per capita (Millions of VND, Constant) 9248.1 22929.7 -2.351 0.022 -1.176 0.245 3,127.834 0.282 38,686.747** 0.009 0.543Number of Non-State Enterprises 1649.8 5987.6 -2.114 0.039 -0.222 0.825 285.590 0.450 14,307.624** 0.021 0.484Number of Local State Owned Enterprises 25.1 43.8 -1.642 0.106 0.550 0.585 -3.790 0.622 80.359** 0.013 0.490Number of Foreign Invested Enterprises 57.81 189.70 -1.571 0.121 0.339 0.736 0.742 0.496 410.110* 0.025 0.465FDI/Local Revenue (%) 9.02 20.79 -2.023 0.047 -2.022 0.048 0.102 0.103 -0.086 0.888 0.387Manufacturing Output/GDP 31.45 43.29 -2.498 0.015 -2.252 0.028 5.851 0.194 6.029 0.240 0.304Service Output/GDP 33.09 36.23 -1.073 0.287 0.376 0.708 -309.257 0.756 2,129.168* 0.035 0.383Agricultural Output/GDP 35.46 20.49 3.076 0.003 1.792 0.079 -3.835 0.835 -22.365*** 1.000 0.583Employees of Private Business 45932.91 149830.90 -2.137 0.037 -0.145 0.885 5,036.913 0.461 329,347.252** 0.020 0.497Average Income of Employee 932628.72 3561772.90 -2.003 0.050 -0.146 0.885 30,264.375 0.492 8974311.691** 0.022 0.487Average Salary of Employee 916954.94 3504676.40 -2.007 0.049 -0.144 0.886 34,775.141 0.490 8814777.942** 0.022 0.488
Structural EndowmentsSurface Area of Province (KM Squared) 5638.5 3230.8 1.936 0.057 1.248 0.217 -1,188.808 0.895 -945.072 0.836 0.599Annual Temperature (Celsius) 24.40 25.60 -1.202 0.234 -1.039 0.303 0.805 0.089 0.357 0.311 0.540Annual Rainfall 153.13 150.70 0.181 0.857 -0.148 0.883 -4.449 0.658 7.104 0.324 0.346Distance from Ha Noi or HCMC 253.0 282.1 -0.380 0.706 -0.236 0.814 42.748 0.131 -36.075 0.846 0.701Province resulted from division of another province (%) 75.47 60.00 1.003 0.320 0.287 0.775 -0.084 0.699 -0.292 0.858 0.120Province has international border (%) 39.62 50.00 -0.603 0.548 -0.790 0.433 0.173 0.195 -0.351* 0.958 0.164
DemographicPopulation (1000s) 1304.109 1709.3 1.792 0.609 1.248 0.550 -309.257 0.756 2,129.168* 0.035 0.383Population Density (Per Square Kilometer) 387.7 819.4 -2.510 0.015 -0.777 0.441 62.837 0.321 906.960** 0.013 0.680Share of Minorities in Population 2.06 1.40 1.450 0.152 0.967 0.338 0.033 0.413 -0.178* 0.962 0.697Secondary School Graduates/Population (%) 84.10 87.74 -1.272 0.208 -0.443 0.659 -0.629 0.658 6.881*** 0.000 0.330
Quality of GovernanceProvincial Competitiveness Index (PCI - 100 pts) 58.48 62.55 -1.948 0.056 -1.177 0.244 2.884 0.135 1.493 0.303 0.333Unweighted PCI 53.12 56.00 -1.692 0.096 -1.078 0.286 2.279 0.139 0.379 0.436 0.331Entry Costs (Subindex 1 - PCI) 8.28 8.45 -0.751 0.455 -0.431 0.668 0.118 0.257 -0.169 0.706 0.236Land Access/Security (Subindex 2 - PCI) 6.44 6.30 0.434 0.666 -0.446 0.658 0.291 0.134 -1.396*** 1.000 0.463Transparency  (Subindex 3 - PCI) 5.84 6.30 -1.325 0.190 -0.803 0.425 0.337 0.243 0.526* 0.046 0.108Time Costs (Subindex 4 - PCI) 6.45 6.98 -1.443 0.154 -0.935 0.354 0.162 0.323 0.218 0.357 0.316Informal Charges (Subindex 5 - PCI) 6.14 6.05 0.269 0.789 -0.159 0.874 0.147 0.313 -0.867** 0.994 0.567Bias toward SOEs   (Subindex 6 - PCI) 5.14 5.57 -1.143 0.258 -1.714 0.092 0.744*** 0.002 -0.656* 0.956 0.295Leadership Proactivity  (Subindex 7 - PCI) 4.96 5.28 -0.542 0.590 -0.412 0.682 0.642 0.215 -0.934 0.854 0.279Business Support  (Subindex 8 - PCI) 5.04 5.59 -1.475 0.145 0.419 0.677 -0.126 0.699 2.395*** 0.000 0.599Labor Quality  (Subindex 9 - PCI) 4.69 5.49 -3.196 0.002 -1.605 0.114 0.415* 0.025 0.854** 0.009 0.381Legal Institutions  (Subindex 10 - PCI) 5.29 5.56 -1.053 0.296 -1.560 0.124 0.291 0.143 -0.249 0.773 0.181"Leaders good at working within law" (PCI %) 72.26 73.06 -0.258 0.798 0.066 0.948 0.016 0.345 -0.039 0.833 0.221"Leaders are creative and clever"  (PCI %) 43.59 47.26 -1.043 0.301 -0.457 0.650 0.043 0.197 -0.025 0.661 0.261"Leaders willing to risk punishment"  (PCI %) 23.20 23.79 -0.224 0.823 -0.253 0.801 0.026 0.259 -0.072 0.923 0.237
Infrastructure Index (from PCI)Infrastructure Index (from PCI) 54.96 61.36 -2.498 0.015 -1.503 0.138 1.832 0.230 6.076*** 0.001 0.520Asphalted Roads (%) 0.51 0.64 -1.670 0.100 -0.720 0.475 0.025 0.339 0.027 0.403 0.460Telephones per Capita 0.26 0.33 -0.634 0.529 0.609 0.545 -0.096 0.787 0.739** 0.022 0.390Number of Industrial Zones (IZ) 2.17 3.60 -1.062 0.292 0.053 0.958 -0.310 0.675 3.358*** 0.001 0.465Percentage of IZ Land Occupied 31.97 43.48 -1.106 0.273 -0.487 0.628 -8.220 0.836 24.740** 0.009 0.439Price of Energy (VND/KW) 761.51 869.48 -1.811 0.075 -1.033 0.306 60.021 0.239 161.207** 0.007 0.182Share of Businesses with E-Mail Addresses (%) 27.41 37.20 -2.829 0.006 -1.101 0.276 0.015 0.228 0.189*** 0.000 0.621
Use of CourtsTotal Number of Cases Filed 113.943 613.4 -2.54 0.01 -0.42 0.68 182.065 0.181 1,228.601** 0.024 0.487Percentage of Cases Filed by Private Plaintiffs 72.1 80.3 -0.91 0.37 -0.65 0.52 0.024 0.383 0.022 0.377 0.089Share of Cases Resolved 69.7 76.4 -1.59 0.12 -1.73 0.09 0.089* 0.038 -0.003 0.524 0.065
N=63 N=58 N=63; Region=7; Robust Standard Errors
Means
 (All)
N=63
Difference in Means Difference in Means  Regression of Variable on Treatment    
 (All)   (No National Cities)  (Controlling for National Level City & Regional FE)
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Table 2: Difference-in-Difference Estimation between 2008 and 2010 using VHLSS Commune Data 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable
All-Year Road in 
Commune
Commune Has 
Public 
Transport
Socio-Dev't/    
Infra. Project
Tap Water is 
Main Source
Village has 
Paved Road
Share of 
Households with 
Supported Crop 
Share of 
Households 
Receiving 
Agricultural 
ExtensionTime (2008 to 2010) -0.007 -0.065*** 0.047** 0.246*** 0.002 0.005 0.010***(0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003)Treatment -0.104** -0.089* -0.022 0.011 -0.065 0.002 -0.007(0.051) (0.051) (0.024) (0.027) (0.041) (0.017) (0.005)Time*Treatment 0.086** 0.102* 0.087 -0.080 0.029 0.051** 0.021*(0.037) (0.053) (0.059) (0.077) (0.027) (0.025) (0.012)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.015 0.102*** -0.001 0.050** 0.004 -0.027*** -0.014***(0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.005)0.098*** 0.116*** -0.069*** 0.112*** 0.056*** -0.056*** -0.021***(0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004)National Level City -0.031 0.020 0.083** 0.059 -0.005 -0.010 0.006(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.038) (0.012) (0.010)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 0.352*** -0.068 0.795*** -0.665*** 0.625*** 0.394*** 0.165***(0.124) (0.155) (0.152) (0.162) (0.125) (0.072) (0.030)Observations 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4109Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.799 0.751 0.555 0.084 0.875 0.076 0.028Number of Province 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.140 0.146 0.054 0.183 0.138 0.271 0.042RMSE 0.369 0.410 0.480 0.365 0.305 0.153 0.093
Commune Population (ln)
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regional fixed effects employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there. Table reports only the first seven outcome variables in dataset.  Full results are reported in Appendix D.  
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Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimation using VHLSS Commune Data on Aggregate Indices 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Transportation 
index
Agricultural 
Services index
Health Service 
index
Education index Communication 
index
Household 
business 
development 
indexTime (2008 to 2010) 0.224*** 0.042 -0.014 0.075*** -0.046** -0.011(0.055) (0.044) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) (0.038)Treatment -0.269*** 0.074 -0.013 0.057 -0.197*** -0.034(0.081) (0.106) (0.017) (0.070) (0.066) (0.158)Time*Treatment 0.225** -0.003 0.123*** 0.091 0.152** 0.007(0.109) (0.106) (0.030) (0.073) (0.061) (0.114)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.170*** 0.102** -0.078*** 0.231*** 0.032 0.368***(0.058) (0.048) (0.021) (0.044) (0.042) (0.065)Commune Population (ln) 0.313*** 0.061 -0.130*** 0.200*** 0.089** 0.454***(0.050) (0.045) (0.019) (0.040) (0.042) (0.063)National Level City 0.126 -0.001 0.030* 0.236*** -0.022 0.189(0.085) (0.066) (0.017) (0.082) (0.042) (0.134)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 1.039*** 2.281*** 1.019*** -0.017 1.705*** -1.253***(0.363) (0.337) (0.146) (0.308) (0.316) (0.486)Observations 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126Mean of dependent variable 2008 3.063 2.513 0.237 1.559 2.000 1.850Number of provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.099 0.124 0.139 0.039 0.131 0.116RMSE 1.004 0.888 0.385 0.851 0.663 1.019
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Transportation 
index
Agricultural 
Services index
Health Service 
index
Education index Communication 
index
Household 
business 
development 
indexTime (2006 to 2008) -0.000 0.083*** -0.007 0.022 0.025 0.032(0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.040)Treatment -0.158 -0.041 0.021 -0.002 -0.146* -0.033(0.104) (0.135) (0.029) (0.086) (0.078) (0.146)Time*Treatment -0.114*** 0.080 -0.033 0.033 -0.051 -0.024(0.012) (0.103) (0.032) (0.032) (0.061) (0.052)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.108** 0.121** -0.089*** 0.234*** -0.024 0.408***(0.053) (0.060) (0.019) (0.041) (0.043) (0.076)Commune Population (ln) 0.198*** 0.109** -0.132*** 0.202*** 0.041 0.501***(0.052) (0.054) (0.017) (0.036) (0.041) (0.077)National Level City 0.095 0.101 0.035 0.187* -0.006 0.148*(0.174) (0.099) (0.029) (0.110) (0.052) (0.087)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 1.866*** 1.964*** 1.058*** 0.022 2.050*** -1.565***(0.359) (0.409) (0.127) (0.260) (0.312) (0.572)Observations 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220Mean of dependent variable (2006) 3.072 2.420 0.248 1.526 1.987 1.840Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.049 0.116 0.139 0.035 0.129 0.123RMSE 0.976 0.918 0.393 0.845 0.682 1.042
Panel 2: Between 2006 and 2008
Panel 1: Between 2008 and 2010
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at the district level and the provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.  Dependent variables are additive indexes created by summing up the groups of variables in Figure 3.   Continuous variables are re-scaled between 0 and 1, and then added in with dichotomous variables.
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Table 4: Test of Hawthorne Effect - Using Visits from Ministry of Home Affairs to Conduct Evaluation 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Transportation index Agricultural Services 
index
Health Service index Education index Communication index Household business 
development index
Time (β1) 0.210*** 0.043 -0.012 0.070*** -0.067*** -0.009(0.056) (0.050) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.041)
Treatment (β2) -0.118 0.194* 0.001 -0.019 -0.163** 0.205(0.128) (0.112) (0.032) (0.107) (0.076) (0.242)
MOHA Survey (β3) -0.224* 0.019 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.509***(0.123) (0.119) (0.025) (0.084) (0.103) (0.175)
Treatment*Survey (β4) -0.181 -0.260 -0.031 0.153 -0.056 -0.770**(0.292) (0.256) (0.047) (0.169) (0.186) (0.323)
Time*Treatment (β5)  Clean ATE 0.110 -0.088 0.125*** 0.145 0.184*** -0.056(0.155) (0.093) (0.048) (0.093) (0.025) (0.148)
Time*Survey (β6)        Hawthorne Test II 0.119 -0.003 -0.018 0.038 0.163*** -0.017(0.143) (0.064) (0.031) (0.046) (0.042) (0.074)
Time*Treatment*Survey (β7)  Hawthorne Test I 0.135 0.175 0.006 -0.136 -0.188 0.165(0.345) (0.227) (0.070) (0.148) (0.152) (0.225)
Intercept (β0) 1.095*** 2.281*** 1.020*** -0.025 1.701*** -1.366***(0.356) (0.341) (0.145) (0.303) (0.316) (0.451)Controls YES YES YES YES YES YESCity Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YESRegional FE YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 4,126 4,126 4,126 4,126 4,126 4,126Number of provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58Mean of dependent variable (2008) 3.063 3.063 3.063 3.063 3.063 3.063R-squared 0.104 0.125 0.140 0.040 0.133 0.130rmse 1.002 0.887 0.385 0.851 0.662 1.011
Transportation index Agricultural Services 
index
Health Service index Education index Communication index Household business 
development index
Control | Survey Control | Survey Control | Survey Control | Survey Control | Survey Control | Survey
Control 3.13    |    2.91 2.49   |   2.51 .24   |   .24 1.55   |   1.57 2.03   |   2.03 1.79   |   2.30
Treatment 3.02   |   2.61 2.68   |   2.44 .24   |   .21 1.53  `  |   1.70 1.86   |   1.81 2.00   |   1.74
Control 3.35   |   3.24 2.53   |   2.55 .22   |   .21 1.62   |   1.68 1.96   |   2.12 1.78   |   2.27
Treatment 3.34   |   3.19 2.64   |   2.57 .35   |   .31 1.75   |   1.82 1.98   |   1.90 1.93   |   1.82Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Triple interaction of treatment, time, and visits by MOHA survey team.   Regional fixed effects employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.
2010
Panel 1: Regression Coefficients (Mutiway-Clustered Standard Errors)
Panel 2: Predicted Effects (By Time, Treatment, and Survey)
2008
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Table 5: Effect of Treatment on Reported Corruption (Traditional Questions, PAPI Survey) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)Baseline Controls Geo-Match Baseline Controls Geo-Match Baseline Controls Geo-MatchTreatment -0.098*** -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.073* -0.084** -0.091* -0.131** -0.137** -0.150**(0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.045) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068)Male 0.002 -0.014 -0.000 -0.007 -0.024 -0.096*(0.022) (0.040) (0.024) (0.039) (0.029) (0.052)Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)Minority -0.030 -0.047 -0.050 -0.052 -0.067* 0.002(0.044) (0.050) (0.031) (0.060) (0.036) (0.077)Government Employee -0.113*** -0.176*** -0.041 -0.077 0.057 0.035(0.031) (0.052) (0.042) (0.051) (0.064) (0.123)Economic Status -0.026* -0.034 -0.008 -0.045 -0.009 -0.036(0.014) (0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.011) (0.020)National Level City 0.046 0.044 -0.027 0.095* 0.097* 0.089 0.032 0.035 0.022(0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.056) (0.057) (0.079) (0.052) (0.052) (0.091)Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesConstant 0.328*** 0.425*** 0.523*** 0.248*** 0.327*** 0.349** 0.701*** 0.794*** 0.774***(0.028) (0.074) (0.127) (0.040) (0.089) (0.153) (0.033) (0.067) (0.111)Observations 5,476 5,414 1,686 5,430 5,378 1,692 5,588 5,535 1,739Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58Mean of dependent variable 0.174 0.174 0.197 0.200 0.200 0.211 0.313 0.313 0.372R-squared 0.046 0.051 0.070 0.014 0.018 0.041 0.164 0.167 0.117
A. Officials divert funds from their budget for their personal benefit.E. Officials receive kickback in exchange for construction permits.F. In order to get a job in government, people have to pay a bribe.
Source: PAPI-UNDP Survey 2011 (Question D402):  I am going to read several statements about events that occur sometimes. When I read them to you, please think about your own experience and tell me how much you agree with each statement. That is to say, you agree completely, you agree somewhat, you disagree or you disagree completely. (Answers were coded as 2. Agree; 1. Somewhat Agree; 0. Disagree, but were re-coded for analysis to 1.. 
Agree; 0. Disagree):
Measures of corruption from Question 
D402 in UNDP-PAPI Survey (2011)
Diversion of Funds Construction Kickbacks Bribe for Job
Regressions employ OLS with probability and post-stratification weights to address the probability of selection with robust standard errors clustered at the province and district levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Regional fixed effects employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.   N varies by number of citizens who experienced service.   In Models 3, 6, and 9 the control group is trimmed to the two closest (by distance in km) non-treated districted in neighboring provinces for ever treatment province.
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Appendix A:  Vietnam Results for MyWorld Survey (http://data.myworld2015.org/) 
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Appendix B: The Importance of Infrastructure, Health, and Education Services 
in Citizens' Evaluation of Governance Quality 
 
Dependent Variable= 
Satisfaction with local 
governance quality (0 -100) 
Infrastructure 
only 
Education 
only Health only All services 
With control 
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Infrastructure 2.374***   2.309*** 2.380***   (0.849)   (0.819) (0.894) Health services  5.823***  5.624*** 5.477***    (1.232)  (1.215) (1.217) Education services   6.861*** 5.564** 5.834**     (2.226) (2.220) (2.214) Male     0.888       (0.956) Age     0.007       (0.026) Minority     1.277       (1.495) Government Employee     -0.016       (0.022) Economic Status     0.005       (0.007) National-Level City     0.018       (0.214) Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 76.532*** 70.889*** 69.460*** 57.774*** 55.379***   (1.895) (2.214) (3.769) (4.318) (5.360) Observations 12,729 12,729 12,729 12,729 12,723 Number of Provinces 63 63 63 63 63 R-squared 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.025 0.026 Regressions employ OLS with probability and post-stratification weights to address the probability of selection with robust standard errors clustered at the province and district levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Appendix C1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables Used in Regressions  (2008-2010) 
 
Independent variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxLog of area 2081 2.926 1.05 0.25 7.35Log of commune area 2081 4.519 1.23 -1.11 7.66Log of commune population density 2081 0.070 0.25 0.00 1.00
Dependent Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Infrastruture index 2081 3.063 1.01 0.00 5.00All-Year Road in Commune 2081 0.799 0.40 0.00 1.00Commune Has Public Transport 2081 0.751 0.43 0.00 1.00Socio-Dev't/    Infra. Project 2081 0.555 0.50 0.00 1.00Tap Water is Main Source 2081 0.084 0.28 0.00 1.00
Agricultural Services index 2081 2.513 0.97 0.00 5.58Village has Paved Road 2081 0.875 0.33 0.00 1.00Share of Households with Supported Crop 2081 0.076 0.18 0.00 1.00Share of Households Receiving Agricultural Extension 2081 0.028 0.09 0.00 0.98Share of Households Receiving Agriculture Tax Exemption 2081 0.162 0.33 0.00 1.00Commune Has Veterinarians 2081 0.916 0.28 0.00 1.00Number of visits by Agricultural Extension Staff 2081 0.092 0.10 0.00 1.80Commune have Staff to Support Crops 2081 0.514 0.50 0.00 1.00Commune has Agricultural Extension Center 2081 0.055 0.23 0.00 1.00Commune Manages Irrigation Plants 2081 0.670 0.47 0.00 1.00
Health Services index 2081 0.237 0.42 0.00 2.00Share of Households Supported w/ Healthcare Fee 2081 0.110 0.24 0.00 1.00Public Health Project 2081 0.127 0.33 0.00 1.00Education and Cultural Programs 2081 0.244 0.43 0.00 1.00
Education index 2081 1.559 0.86 0.00 4.24Share of Households Supported w/Tuition fee 2071 0.021 0.03 0.00 0.25Commune with Upper Secondary School 2081 0.160 0.37 0.00 1.00Commune with Kindergarten 2081 0.617 0.49 0.00 1.00Village with a Primary School 2081 0.516 0.50 0.00 1.00
Communication index 2081 2.000 0.72 0.00 3.00Commune with Radio Broadcast 2081 0.806 0.40 0.00 1.00Commune with Post Office 2081 0.897 0.30 0.00 1.00Village with Post Office 2081 0.297 0.46 0.00 1.00
Household business development index 2081 1.850 1.10 0.00 5.60Share of Households w/ Credit Support 2081 0.155 0.19 0.00 1.00Share of households  w/ Business Tax Exemption 2081 0.010 0.07 0.00 1.00Commune with Market or Inter-commune Market 2081 0.637 0.48 0.00 1.00Commune with Nonfarm Business 2081 0.605 0.49 0.00 1.00Village with Daily Market 2081 0.287 0.45 0.00 1.00Village with Periodic Market 2081 0.113 0.32 0.00 1.00Village with Wholesale Market 2081 0.042 0.20 0.00 1.00
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Appendix C2: Full Description of All Independent Variables Used in Main Regression  
 
Individual Indicators Code Question 
All-Year Road in Commune This variable =1 if Q1=1 and 
Q2=12 of section 5 
Q1. Is there a road passable by car to the People Committee Office of this commune? 
Q2. Usually how many months of the year is this road passable by car? 
Commune Has Public Transport Q11, section 5 Q11. Is there a passenger bus line, train or water transport that passes through the village? 
Socio-Dev't/ Infra. Project Q5, section 2, answer code = 
3 
Q5. Is there the following project in the commune:  
Job creation    1 
Hunger elimination and poverty reduction  2 
Socio economic and infrastructure  3 
Investment on culture and education   4 
Health and public health   5 
Environment/clean water   6 
Others (specify___________)   7 
Tap Water is Main Source Q23, section 5 
 
Answer code = 1, 2 and 3. 
Q 23. What is the main source of drinking /cooking water for most people in this commune 
during the [.season.]? 
Indoor private piped water   1 
Outdoor private piped water  2 
Public piped water   3 
Well water    4 
Well with protection walls                  5 
Well without protection walls                   6 
Stream water with protection  7 
Stream water without protection              8 
Rainwater                                                  9 
Bottled water                                              10 
Water brought by pedicab   11 
Tank water                                                 12 
river lake pond…………                13 
other (specify_________________)          14 
Village has Paved Road Q7, section 5. 
Answer=1 or 2. 
7. What is the material surface of the road? 
  
Cement/asphalt...... 1 
Tar on gravel........................ 2 
Gravel............................................ 3 
Dirt/earth.................................. 4 
Other (specify_).................................... 5 
 
Share of Households with Supported 
Crop 
Q7d, section 2 D7d. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many 
households/people received Relief Fund for natural disasters and pre-harvest shortage? 
Share of Households Receiving 
Agricultural Extension 
Q7e, section 2 D7e. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many 
households/people received Agricultural Extension training? 
Share of Households Receiving 
Agriculture Tax Exemption 
Q7g, section 2 Q7g. Exemption from land-use tax in  agriculture (excluding the Households which exempted  
according to State's policy) 
Commune Has Veterinarians Q35, section 4 35. Does this commune have an animal health worker (veterinarian)? 
Number of visits by Agricultural 
Extension Staff 
Q33, section 4 33. How many times have staffs of agriculture extension center visited/ contacted the farmers of 
this commune in the last 12 months. 
Commune have Staff to Support 
Crops 
Q34, section 4 
34. Does this commune have a plant protection official? 
Commune has Agricultural Extension 
Center 
Q26, section 4 26. Is there any agriculture extension center in this commune? 
Commune Manages Irrigation Plants Q21, section 5 21. Does this commune have any small irrigation system which managed by commune level or 
lower levels? 
Share of Households Supported w/ 
Healthcare Fee 
Q7c, section 2 D7c. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many 
households/people received Exemption or reduction in hospital fees? 
  
f 
 
Public Health Project Q5, section 2, answer code = 5 Q5. Is there the following project in the commune:  Job creation     1 
Hunger elimination and poverty reduction  2 
Socio economic and infrastructure  3 
Investment on culture and education   4 
Health and public health   5 
Environment/clean water   6 
Others (specify___________)   7 Education and Cultural Programs Q5, section 2, answer code = 4 Q5. Is there the following project in the commune:  Job creation     1 
Hunger elimination and poverty reduction  2 
Socio economic and infrastructure  3 
Investment on culture and education   4 
Health and public health   5 
Environment/clean water   6 
Others (specify___________)   7 Share of Households Supported w/Tuition fee Q7c, section 2 D7c. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many households/people received Exemption or reduction in tuition fees? Commune with Upper Secondary School Q3, section 6 Q1. Does this commune have an Upper Secondary School? Commune with Kindergarten Q26, section 6 Q26. Is there a kindergarten in this commune? Village with a Primary School Q6, section 6 Q9. Is a Primary School located in village? Commune with Radio Broadcast Q20, section 5 20. Does this commune have any commune radio station? Commune with Post Office Q18, section 5 Q18. Does this commune have any commune cultural post office? Village with Post Office Q24, section 5, 
Answer code=5 
24. Is [....] located within this village? 1. Daily market 2. Periodic market 3. Wholesale market 4. Commune's people committee office 5. Post office 6. Bank/bank branch Share of Households w/ Credit Support Q7a, section 2 D7a. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many households/people received credit/loans? Share of households w/ Business Tax Exemption Q7f, section 2 D7e. In 2007, through the HEPR program and other social support programs, how many households/people received business tax exemption? Commune with Market or Inter-commune Market Q22, section 5 Q 22. Does this commune have any commune market/inter--commune market? Commune with Nonfarm Business Q1, section 3 Q1. Is there any enterprise/firm/factory located in the area that the people from the commune can go there for work and come  back home within the day Village with Daily Market Q24, section 5, 
Answer code=1 
24. Is [....] located within this village? 1. Daily market 2. Periodic market 3. Wholesale market 4. Commune's people committee office 5. Post office 6. Bank/bank branch Village with Periodic Market Q24, section 5, 
Answer code=2 
24. Is [....] located within this village? 1. Daily market 2. Periodic market 3. Wholesale market 4. Commune's people committee office 5. Post office 6. Bank/bank branch Village with Wholesale Market Q24, section 5, 
Answer code=3 
24. Is [....] located within this village? 1. Daily market 2. Periodic market 3. Wholesale market 4. Commune's people committee office 5. Post office 6. Bank/bank branch 
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Appendix D: Difference-in-Difference Estimation between 2008 and 2010 using 
VHLSS Commune Data 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All-Year Road in 
Commune
Commune Has 
Public 
Transport
Socio-Dev't/    
Infra. Project
Tap Water is 
Main Source
Village has 
Paved Road
Share of 
Households 
with Supported 
Crop 
Share of 
Households 
Receiving 
Agricultural 
Extension
Share of 
Households 
Receiving 
Agriculture Tax 
ExemptionTime (2008 to 2010) -0.007 -0.065*** 0.047** 0.246*** 0.002 0.005 0.010*** -0.005(0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003) (0.020)Treatment -0.104** -0.089* -0.022 0.011 -0.065 0.002 -0.007 0.063(0.051) (0.051) (0.024) (0.027) (0.041) (0.017) (0.005) (0.042)Time*Treatment 0.086** 0.102* 0.087 -0.080 0.029 0.051** 0.021* -0.043(0.037) (0.053) (0.059) (0.077) (0.027) (0.025) (0.012) (0.029)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.015 0.102*** -0.001 0.050** 0.004 -0.027*** -0.014*** -0.095***(0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.005) (0.018)Commune Population (ln) 0.098*** 0.116*** -0.069*** 0.112*** 0.056*** -0.056*** -0.021*** -0.123***(0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004) (0.015)National-Level City -0.031 0.020 0.083** 0.059 -0.005 -0.010 0.006 -0.013(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.038) (0.012) (0.010) (0.035)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 0.352*** -0.068 0.795*** -0.665*** 0.625*** 0.394*** 0.165*** 0.992***(0.124) (0.155) (0.152) (0.162) (0.125) (0.072) (0.030) (0.124)Observations 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.401 0.432 0.497 0.277 0.331 0.177 0.085 0.334Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.140 0.146 0.054 0.183 0.138 0.271 0.042 0.105RMSE 0.369 0.410 0.480 0.365 0.305 0.153 0.093 0.312(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Commune Has 
Veterinarians
Number of 
visits by 
Agricultural 
Extension Staff
Commune have 
Staff to Support 
Crops
Commune has 
Agricultural 
Extension 
Center
Commune 
Manages 
Irrigation Plants
Share of 
Households 
Supported w/ 
Healthcare Fee
Public Health 
ProjectTime (2008 to 2010) 0.045*** -0.002 -0.025 0.001 0.013 -0.013 -0.000(0.017) (0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012)Treatment 0.011 -0.010 0.031 0.035** -0.050 0.005 -0.018(0.024) (0.008) (0.076) (0.017) (0.046) (0.014) (0.022)Time*Treatment -0.050 0.020 -0.012 -0.008 0.017 0.039*** 0.084***(0.031) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.045) (0.015) (0.031)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.058** 0.014** 0.069** 0.043*** 0.054** -0.059*** -0.019(0.023) (0.006) (0.029) (0.009) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016)Commune Population (ln) 0.067*** 0.012** 0.111*** 0.032*** 0.040** -0.106*** -0.024*(0.024) (0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013)National-Level City -0.029 0.011 0.088 0.004 -0.058 0.013 0.017(0.026) (0.023) (0.073) (0.021) (0.059) (0.014) (0.024)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 0.487*** -0.029 0.019 -0.230*** 0.484*** 0.751*** 0.269***(0.184) (0.039) (0.164) (0.061) (0.148) (0.112) (0.104)Observations 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.278 0.104 0.500 0.229 0.470 0.238 0.333Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.066 0.083 0.175 0.013 0.062 0.282 0.013RMSE 0.238 0.107 0.454 0.229 0.454 0.195 0.336
Independent/Outcome Variables
Independent/Outcome Variables
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there. 
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Appendix D: Difference-in-Difference Estimation between 2008 and 2010 using 
VHLSS Commune Data (Cont.) 
   
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
Education and 
Cultural 
Programs
Share of 
Households 
Supported 
w/Tuition fee
Commune 
with Upper 
Secondary 
School
Commune 
with 
Kindergarten
Village with a 
Primary 
School
Commune 
with Radio 
Broadcast
Commune 
with Post 
Office
Village with 
Post OfficeTime (2008 to 2010) 0.069*** -0.000 0.016 0.035*** -0.045*** 0.011 -0.006 -0.051***(0.019) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019)Treatment 0.009 0.001 0.071*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.136* -0.011 -0.050*(0.037) (0.001) (0.026) (0.048) (0.036) (0.075) (0.026) (0.028)Time*Treatment 0.083* 0.002 0.003 -0.011 0.014 0.057 0.042** 0.053*(0.047) (0.002) (0.043) (0.014) (0.047) (0.039) (0.021) (0.031)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.012 -0.010*** 0.129*** 0.117*** -0.016 0.070** 0.034** -0.073***(0.020) (0.002) (0.016) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.019)Commune Population (ln) -0.017 -0.015*** 0.132*** 0.146*** -0.046* 0.112*** 0.028* -0.052***(0.019) (0.002) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017)National-Level City 0.017 0.003 0.020 0.054 0.142** -0.009 -0.068*** 0.055(0.034) (0.002) (0.028) (0.061) (0.066) (0.041) (0.016) (0.063)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 0.250* 0.114*** -0.859*** -0.210 0.689*** 0.216 0.721*** 0.768***(0.150) (0.012) (0.129) (0.191) (0.201) (0.207) (0.125) (0.134)Observations 4126 4109 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.429 0.032 0.367 0.486 0.500 0.395 0.304 0.457Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.056 0.211 0.036 0.181 0.083 0.306 0.016 0.026RMSE 0.437 0.030 0.370 0.436 0.479 0.322 0.303 0.441(24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Share of 
Households 
w/ Credit 
Support
Share of 
households  
w/ Business 
Tax 
Exemption
Commune 
with Market 
or Inter-
commune 
Market
Commune 
with Nonfarm 
Business
Village with 
Daily Market
Village with 
Periodic 
Market
Village with 
Wholesale 
MarketTime (2008 to 2010) 0.021*** -0.000 0.015 -0.010 -0.027** -0.007 -0.004(0.007) (0.003) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007)Treatment 0.036 0.004 0.040 -0.007 -0.080 -0.016 -0.010(0.025) (0.004) (0.050) (0.061) (0.052) (0.033) (0.024)Time*Treatment -0.054*** 0.001 -0.042 0.033 0.044 0.011 0.015(0.012) (0.006) (0.034) (0.048) (0.037) (0.020) (0.013)Surface Area of Commune (ln) -0.079*** -0.009** 0.214*** 0.117*** 0.072*** 0.032** 0.021***(0.011) (0.005) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.016) (0.008)Commune Population (ln) -0.098*** -0.012*** 0.238*** 0.175*** 0.105*** 0.030** 0.016*(0.010) (0.004) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.009)National-Level City -0.015 -0.001 -0.028 0.063* 0.101 0.048 0.021(0.020) (0.002) (0.034) (0.034) (0.076) (0.040) (0.018)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 0.815*** 0.093*** -1.105*** -0.525*** -0.392** -0.054 -0.086(0.073) (0.032) (0.187) (0.163) (0.179) (0.105) (0.069)Observations 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.188 0.070 0.481 0.489 0.453 0.317 0.201Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.188 0.019 0.110 0.104 0.098 0.038 0.008RMSE 0.174 0.068 0.451 0.463 0.427 0.306 0.199
Independent/Outcome Variables
Independent/Outcome Variables
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there. 
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Appendix E: Testing the Parallel Paths Assumption: Using Pre-Treatment VHLSS 
2006-2008 
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All-Year Road 
in Commune
Commune Has 
Public 
Transport
Socio-Dev't/    
Infra. Project
Tap Water is 
Main Source
Village has 
Paved Road
Share of 
Households 
with 
Supported 
Crop 
Share of 
Households 
Receiving 
Agricultural 
Extension
Share of 
Households 
Receiving 
Agriculture 
Tax 
ExemptionTime (2008 to 2010) 0.021** -0.029** -0.012 0.013** 0.007 0.036*** -0.001 -0.007(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.002) (0.018)Treatment -0.036 -0.012 -0.038** -0.022 -0.051 0.016 -0.013 0.036**(0.050) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.039) (0.025) (0.008) (0.015)Time*Treatment -0.070** -0.079** 0.012 0.042** -0.019 -0.016 -0.001 0.030(0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.038) (0.007) (0.042)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.016 0.091*** -0.023 0.012 0.012 -0.029*** -0.013*** -0.093***(0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.004) (0.021)Commune Population (ln) 0.091*** 0.109*** -0.095*** 0.038** 0.054*** -0.054*** -0.016*** -0.125***(0.014) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.018)National-Level City -0.050 0.043 0.048 0.084*** -0.030 -0.004 0.043** 0.001(0.066) (0.059) (0.057) (0.020) (0.075) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021)Regional FE 0.386*** 0.019 1.016*** -0.189* 0.634*** 0.360*** 0.139*** 0.980***Constant (0.098) (0.179) (0.172) (0.115) (0.094) (0.057) (0.028) (0.146)YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220Mean of dependent variable 2006 0.782 0.792 0.566 0.067 0.865 0.042 0.029 0.166Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.140 0.139 0.052 0.040 0.155 0.192 0.026 0.107RMSE 0.377 0.390 0.483 0.258 0.309 0.137 0.0896 0.319(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Commune Has 
Veterinarians
Number of 
visits by 
Agricultural 
Extension Staff
Commune 
have Staff to 
Support Crops
Commune has 
Agricultural 
Extension 
Center
Commune 
Manages 
Irrigation 
Plants
Share of 
Households 
Supported w/ 
Healthcare 
Fee
Public Health 
Project
Time (2008 to 2010) 0.030** 0.011** 0.031* -0.016 -0.000 0.006 -0.012(0.013) (0.005) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013)Treatment -0.017 0.001 -0.018 -0.013 -0.033 0.010 0.010(0.038) (0.009) (0.080) (0.015) (0.038) (0.010) (0.026)Time*Treatment 0.014 -0.017* 0.042 0.049** -0.021 -0.004 -0.030(0.043) (0.009) (0.046) (0.025) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.080*** 0.009* 0.068*** 0.037*** 0.063** -0.055*** -0.034*(0.029) (0.005) (0.023) (0.011) (0.032) (0.014) (0.018)Commune Population (ln) 0.100*** 0.009 0.116*** 0.031*** 0.047* -0.097*** -0.035**(0.028) (0.005) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014)National-Level City -0.038 0.027** 0.061 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.025(0.051) (0.012) (0.087) (0.014) (0.092) (0.016) (0.029)Regional FE 0.262 -0.006 -0.000 -0.200*** 0.429** 0.692*** 0.365***Constant (0.205) (0.039) (0.134) (0.077) (0.195) (0.091) (0.111)YES YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220Mean of dependent variable 2006 0.883 0.084 0.479 0.064 0.674 0.102 0.143Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.090 0.078 0.178 0.012 0.070 0.286 0.012RMSE 0.287 0.0945 0.453 0.236 0.453 0.197 0.340
Independent/Outcome Variables
Independent/Outcome Variables
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there. 
j 
 
Appendix E: Testing the Parallel Paths Assumption: Using Pre-Treatment VHLSS 
2006-2008 (Cont.) 
 
 
 
  
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
Education and 
Cultural 
Programs
Share of 
Households 
Supported 
w/Tuition fee
Commune 
with Upper 
Secondary 
School
Commune 
with 
Kindergarten
Village with a 
Primary 
School
Commune 
with Radio 
Broadcast
Commune 
with Post 
Office
Village with 
Post OfficeTime (2008 to 2010) -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 0.032** -0.001 0.000 0.031*** -0.006(0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.023)Treatment 0.012 0.001 0.040** 0.028 -0.084 -0.136* 0.015 -0.025(0.013) (0.003) (0.019) (0.054) (0.060) (0.073) (0.031) (0.037)Time*Treatment -0.003 0.001 0.021 -0.062* 0.075*** -0.015 -0.020 -0.015(0.010) (0.002) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.013) (0.043)Surface Area of Commune (ln) 0.002 -0.009*** 0.142*** 0.124*** -0.025 0.059* 0.013 -0.096***(0.020) (0.002) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.020) (0.021)Commune Population (ln) -0.029** -0.014*** 0.145*** 0.154*** -0.054*** 0.103*** 0.005 -0.067***(0.013) (0.001) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.015) (0.022)National-Level City -0.009 0.001 0.045 0.102 0.048 0.060 -0.052 -0.014(0.027) (0.002) (0.045) (0.105) (0.054) (0.062) (0.037) (0.047)Regional FE 0.336*** 0.105*** -0.950*** -0.241 0.772*** 0.300 0.847*** 0.902***Constant (0.104) (0.011) (0.135) (0.184) (0.157) (0.222) (0.123) (0.163)YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 4,220 4,203 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.246 0.021 0.159 0.589 0.511 0.811 0.868 0.307Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.048 0.196 0.040 0.212 0.071 0.321 0.015 0.022RMSE 0.420 0.0304 0.359 0.434 0.482 0.324 0.320 0.454(24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Share of 
Households 
w/ Credit 
Support
Share of 
households  
w/ Business 
Tax 
Exemption
Commune 
with Market 
or Inter-
commune 
Market
Commune 
with Nonfarm 
Business
Village with 
Daily Market
Village with 
Periodic 
Market
Village with 
Wholesale 
MarketTime (2008 to 2010) 0.017*** -0.004 -0.018** 0.046*** -0.018 0.001 0.007(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009)Treatment 0.022 0.013** -0.013 -0.051 -0.048 -0.008 0.051***(0.020) (0.006) (0.048) (0.047) (0.059) (0.027) (0.018)Time*Treatment 0.005 -0.006 0.037 0.028 -0.031 0.002 -0.059***(0.010) (0.008) (0.028) (0.045) (0.030) (0.031) (0.023)Surface Area of Commune (ln) -0.064*** -0.011* 0.249*** 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.014 0.018*(0.008) (0.006) (0.038) (0.034) (0.030) (0.016) (0.009)Commune Population (ln) -0.076*** -0.014** 0.265*** 0.177*** 0.116*** 0.016 0.016**(0.009) (0.006) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008)National-Level City 0.012 -0.002 0.017 0.100 0.061 -0.042* 0.003(0.011) (0.004) (0.025) (0.072) (0.051) (0.024) (0.023)Regional FE 0.656*** 0.105** -1.288*** -0.576*** -0.452** 0.072 -0.084Constant (0.061) (0.046) (0.260) (0.208) (0.203) (0.102) (0.062)YES YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220Mean of dependent variable 2008 0.138 0.015 0.644 0.554 0.309 0.110 0.042Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.120 0.040 0.116 0.111 0.093 0.036 0.009RMSE 0.169 0.0821 0.451 0.466 0.436 0.310 0.200
Independent/Outcome Variables
Independent/Outcome Variables
Regressions employ OLS with standard errors clustered at district level and provincial level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there. 
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Appendix F: Province-Level Diff-in-Diff Estimation using VHLSS Data on Aggregate 
Indices 
 
  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Transportation 
index
Agricultural 
Services index
Health Service 
index
Education index Communication 
index
Household 
business 
development 
indexTime (2008 to 2010) 0.216*** 0.058 -0.028 0.079** -0.045* -0.004(0.064) (0.046) (0.020) (0.032) (0.024) (0.039)Treatment -0.332*** 0.065 -0.005 0.154 -0.196** -0.032(0.111) (0.118) (0.035) (0.097) (0.084) (0.188)Time*Treatment 0.377** 0.005 0.109** 0.014 0.136* 0.085(0.169) (0.137) (0.044) (0.095) (0.080) (0.178)National-Level City 0.203* 0.131* -0.019 0.385** -0.026 0.202(0.111) (0.078) (0.037) (0.148) (0.057) (0.142)Regional FE 3.165*** 2.782*** 0.156*** 1.489*** 2.250*** 1.923***Constant (0.075) (0.091) (0.024) (0.081) (0.046) (0.123)YES YES YES YES YES YESObservations 116 116 116 116 116 116Mean of dependent variable 2008 3.066 2.435 0.255 1.588 1.962 1.823Number of provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.415 0.467 0.584 0.368 0.611 0.430RMSE 0.387 0.363 0.128 0.237 0.219 0.372
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Transportation 
index
Agricultural 
Services index
Health Service 
index
Education index Communication 
index
Household 
business 
development 
indexTime (2006 to 2008) 0.016 0.085** -0.011 0.017 0.030 0.046(0.032) (0.041) (0.019) (0.035) (0.025) (0.040)Treatment -0.158 -0.066 0.024 0.087 -0.221** -0.024(0.126) (0.160) (0.034) (0.099) (0.089) (0.163)Time*Treatment -0.129* 0.120 -0.032 0.059 0.015 -0.077(0.072) (0.178) (0.044) (0.064) (0.096) (0.136)National-Level City 0.075 0.087 -0.008 0.352** 0.007 0.290**(0.166) (0.126) (0.024) (0.140) (0.051) (0.135)Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YESConstant 3.214*** 2.809*** 0.154*** 1.521*** 2.224*** 1.963***(0.055) (0.087) (0.022) (0.092) (0.046) (0.113)Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116Mean of dependent variable (2006) 3.075 2.389 0.261 1.574 1.948 1.817Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.329 0.373 0.570 0.285 0.603 0.473RMSE 0.338 0.431 0.139 0.260 0.235 0.369
Panel 1: Between 2008 and 2010
Panel 2: Between 2006 and 2008
Regressions employ OLS on provincial averages of dependent variables with robust standard errors clustered at the province level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.  Dependent variables are additive indexes created by summing up the groups of variables in Figure 3.   Continuous variables are re-scaled between 0 and 1, and then added in with dichotomous variables.
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Appendix G: Randomization Inference Test on Distribution of Significant Outcomes - Comparison of Treatment to Monte Carlo Estimation with 1000 Simulations. Left side depicts the results from the actual abolishment of District People’s Councils. The right side depicts the results of the Monte Carlo simulation, where an artificial treatment was randomly assigned to provinces.     
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Appendix H: Access to Basic Public Services (Robustness Using UNDP-PAPI 2011) 
The survey uses a clustered sampling approach to provide empirically reliable estimates at all levels of Vietnamese 
government (province, district, commune, and village. In 2011, all 63 provinces were included in the sample.  
Within each province, the capital district was selected along with two others using probability proportional to size 
(PPS) sampling. A similar strategy was used to select three communes in each district and two villages in each 
commune.  Sampling and post-stratification weights are used in the analysis. 
 
    
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Garbage is 
Picked Up
Total Hospital 
Quality
Main Drinking 
Water is 
Lake/River
Total 
Education 
QualityTreatment 0.150*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.153*** 0.819** -0.038*** 0.383(0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.055) (0.399) (0.013) (0.360)Male -0.006 -0.003 0.730** -0.018* 0.713**(0.024) (0.019) (0.310) (0.011) (0.293)Age -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000 -0.036***(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.013)Minority -0.075* -0.215*** 0.452 -0.038** -0.898**(0.041) (0.038) (0.366) (0.018) (0.359)Government Employee 0.124 0.059 1.398** -0.063*** 1.687**(0.076) (0.047) (0.607) (0.017) (0.705)Economic Status 0.012 0.006 -0.007 0.009 0.151(0.011) (0.010) (0.139) (0.007) (0.165)National-Level City 0.042 0.041 0.110** 0.841 -0.089*** 0.497(0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.556) (0.019) (0.465)Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesConstant 0.260*** 0.167*** 0.138** 0.829*** 4.641*** 0.143*** 5.423***(0.022) (0.053) (0.065) (0.072) (0.653) (0.034) (0.888)Observations 7,940 7,940 7,848 7,705 3,998 7,853 3,115Mean of dependent variable 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.482 5.429 0.057 5.201Number of Provinces 58 58 58 58 58 58 58R-squared 0.014 0.054 0.060 0.382 0.026 0.062 0.043
Road in Front of House is Paved
Regressions employ OLS with probability and post-stratification weights to address the probability of selection with robust standard errors clustered at the province and the district levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Hospital and education quality are measured on 6-point scales, garbage pickup and drink water are dichotous variables, distance is continuous.  Regional fixed-effects employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.  N varies by number of citizens who experienced service (i.e. must have used hospital or have kids in school).
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Appendix I: Equality of Service Delivery by District within Province (Aggregate 
Indices) 
 
  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Transportation 
index (Gini)
Agricultural 
Services index 
(Gini)
Health Service 
index (Gini)
Education index 
(Gini)
Communication 
index (Gini)
Household 
business 
development 
index (Gini)Time (2008 to 2010) 0.003 -0.015 0.024 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013(0.007) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015)Treatment 0.020 0.017 0.050 -0.013 0.020 -0.022(0.016) (0.019) (0.043) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)Time*Treatment -0.022 -0.016 -0.094 0.017 0.006 0.033(0.024) (0.024) (0.058) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032)National-Level City 0.023 0.003 -0.130** 0.007 0.021 -0.019(0.017) (0.014) (0.056) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023)Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesConstant 0.362*** 0.448* 0.564 -0.006 0.097 0.242(0.138) (0.249) (0.449) (0.222) (0.199) (0.273)Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114Mean of Dependent Variable (2008) 0.121 0.153 0.511 0.187 0.127 0.216Number of provinces 57 57 57 57 57 57R-squared 0.295 0.328 0.303 0.253 0.392 0.373
Between 2008 and 2010
Regressions employ OLS on provincial averages of dependent variables with robust standard errors clustered at the province level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   Regional fixed-effects are employed for seven major regions, but five provinces of the Central Highlands are dropped, as no pilot occurred there.  Dependent variables are the Gini coefficients, measuring the inequality of public service delivery among districts within the 57 provinces.
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Appendix J: Changes in Local Leadership after Pilot 
 
Between 2008 and 2010 
Dependent Variable=1 if Commune leader was 
replaced Treatment -0.032   (0.057) National-Level City 0.025   (0.081) Regional FE Yes Constant 0.623   (0.048) Observations 690 Ratio of Change to Total Leaders (T) 39/91 Ratio of Change to Total Leaders (C) 225/599 Pseudo R-squared 0.0352 Probit regression on dichotomous leadership variable change (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   Regional fixed-effects are employed for the seven major regions, 
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Appendix K: Difference-in-Means in Special Projects in Province (during Pilot) 
   
Control Treatment T-Statistic P-Value
Level of MOHA Funding over Provincial GDP 2010 n=53 n=10Total funding for all programs 3.03% 2.08% 1.02 0.31Official development assistance 0.45% 0.46% 0.05 0.96Infrastructure for port econ zone 0.08% 0.15% 0.66 0.51Agricultural extension 0.03% 0.04% 0.41 0.69Infrastructure for tourism 0.09% 0.06% 0.91 0.37Local healthcare 0.06% 0.03% 1.74 0.09Province/district split 0.22% 0.05% 1.40 0.17Funding for minority people 0.02% 0.01% 0.88 0.38Cutural programs 0.05% 0.04% 0.13 0.90ODA matching fund 0.16% 0.10% 1.00 0.32Other programs 0.34% 0.27% 0.49 0.63Forest development 0.02% 0.02% 0.62 0.54
Growth in MOHA Funding between 2008 and 2010 n=53 n=10Total funding for all programs 4.4% -10.7% 1.42 0.16Official development assistance 24.8% -15.4% 1.70 0.09Infrastructure for port econ zone -6.6% 5.5% 0.31 0.76Agricultural extension -36.5% -13.7% 1.35 0.18Infrastructure for tourism -4.7% -16.3% 1.72 0.09Local healthcare -55.8% -58.3% 0.33 0.74Province/district split 16.9% 27.8% 0.41 0.68Funding for minority people -90.2% -79.0% 0.61 0.54Cutural programs -24.0% -41.5% 0.65 0.52ODA matching fund 53.2% 15.8% 1.03 0.31Other programs -2.2% -14.3% 0.60 0.55Forest development -26.3% -35.5% 0.64 0.52
Variable
Means Difference in Means
 (All)  (All)
Data is non-public data from the Ministry of Finance (2008-2010).    We standardize both figures by nominal, provincial GDP. 
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Appendix L: Difference-in-Means State Investment in Province (during Pilot) 
 
Control Treatment T-Statistic P-Value
Level of Central SOE Transfer Indicators (2009 & 2010) n=100 n=20Capital/Provincial GDP 25.30% 28.71% -0.16 0.87Liabilities/Provincial GDP 17.30% 21.77% -0.29 0.77State Equity/Provincial GDP 8.00% 6.93% 0.17 0.87Investment/Provincial GDP 1.31% 1.31% -0.01 0.99Construction Outlays/Provincial GDP 4.16% 2.17% 0.34 0.73Assets under Management/Provincial GDP 2.06% 2.18% -0.17 0.87
Growth in Central SOE Transfer Indicators (2008-2010) n=49 n=10Capital/Provincial GDP 23.3% 13.2% 0.28 0.78Liabilities/Provincial GDP 16.7% 9.3% 0.27 0.78State Equity/Provincial GDP 6.6% 3.8% 0.28 0.78Investment/Provincial GDP 0.3% -0.8% 2.34 0.02Construction Outlays/Provincial GDP 2.6% -0.4% 0.86 0.39Assets under Management/Provincial GDP 0.8% 0.6% 0.25 0.80
Means Difference in Means
 (All)  (All)
Data is from the GSO Enterprise Census (2008-2010). Using the annual census, we create aggregate measures for centrally-managed SOEs in each province.   We standardize both figures by nominal, provincial GDP. 
Variable
